Space Shuttle Columbia: The Final Flight (2024) s01e04 Episode Script
PART FOUR
1
♪
-For the second
time in nasa's history,
A space shuttle has been
lost along with its entire crew.
Once again, we
are asking ourselves,
How could this have happened?
-Do you have any
idea how big that
Piece of foam was that came off?
-We'd heard some
reports that during launch
There had been some
concerns that some debris
Hit the wing.
Is that true and is that
any cause of concern
And that could have
caused today's problems?
-It is true.
It was judged that, erm ,
That event did not
represent a safety concern.
-This happened under my watch,
But I didn't have the answers.
In every public forum
I'm gonna have to be in,
How am I gonna
explain this to anybody?
At this time, we
have no indication
That the mishap was
caused by anything
Or anyone on the ground.
-Nasa never
wants to look stupid.
Nasa wants to be the
agency with the answers.
-My thoughts are
on what we missed,
What I missed
To allow this to happen.
-But if you overlook something,
It will come to bite
you one day or another.
♪
♪
-I was playing tennis
in mclean, virginia.
I received a phone call saying
That I would be
flown immediately
To barksdale air force base.
After challenger,
Nasa had a
contingency plan in case
There was a shuttle accident.
I never really imagined
that it would happen.
With columbia, we had
people who had experience
With accident investigation
from the military,
Navy, and air force on the team.
-I came to the investigation
as a helicopter pilot
Who knew something about
doing accident investigations.
I did not come to
the investigation
As a space shuttle expert.
I literally knew nothing about
How the shuttle
was put together.
We needed nasa's help
because by definition,
Everybody who came
in as an external part
Of the investigation team
is not a space shuttle expert.
There was years of
shuttle program knowledge
That we needed to
learn very quickly.
-There's that issue
of the falling foam
During the launch of
space shuttle columbia.
-Very early on nasa told us
That they knew about
a foam a debris event.
But we didn't even know
enough about the shuttle
To understand that there
was foam on the tanks.
The press wants to
know what happened
And it's like,
"yep, so do we."
-It's a mammoth job for those
taking part in a mammoth task.
-Covering many
hundreds of square miles.
-It's the largest
recovery effort
That has ever been
attempted in this country.
-As an investigator,
I wanted as ironclad a case
As we could possibly
have for the sequence
Of events leading to
the cause of the crash
Of space shuttle columbia.
But if we were going to do that,
We needed to
collect all the debris
And reconstruct the shuttle.
-1,200 sites have
been identified.
-All those pieces of
columbia will be brought
To the kennedy space center,
Where it will be reassembled
In a manner of speaking.
-Really thousands
of pieces of debris
Are now pieces to a puzzle.
♪
-Under a crisp texas sky,
Thousands of
mourners are gathering,
Including that man,
neil armstrong ,
As nasa gathers to say
farewell to seven of its own.
-Knowing that I wasn't
gonna see my dad again
And losing that many people
That you love and that
you're close to all at once.
It was just so heavy.
The world just
became a scary place.
-Just felt like I
was so, like
Raw, just so Exposed.
-To have your dad
die in a public way,
And you have press
focused in on you.
I knew I didn't
want to be there.
-Just like a feeling of, like,
How are we supposed to act?
-The grief is heavy.
Our nation shares
in your sorrow.
And in your pride.
-This isn't my
own personal loss.
You kind of realise that
this this is a public story,
A national grieving.
Everybody felt like they
lost something of theirs.
-In your grief, you
are responding
As your friends
would have wished,
With focus, professionalism,
and unbroken faith
In the mission of this agency.
The people of nasa are
being tested once again.
-I could see outside
the window all the crowd.
I had my suit and tie on.
And I said to myself,
"I'm gonna go outside,"
And then I couldn't.
I just shut the door,
Locked it, and I just
sobbed at my desk.
The president's talking
outside, and I was just sobbing,
And sobbing, and sobbing.
Inside johnson space center,
The internal
conflict was building.
-On the first day
that we went in,
There were people who
received us very well,
There were people who were
not happy that we were here.
-I was one of the first people
To be interviewed
and interrogated.
I felt ok, I felt like,
"this is a good thing,
This has to happen. I
hope they're thorough."
-I think the folks
that were probably
Less interested in our help
Were more at the
management level in nasa.
In some cases,
we're asking for data,
And then they'd be
like, "I can't give you
That information right
now, you're gonna have to
Go up through a very formal
Nasa chain of command
to be approved."
-I call it the managers' club.
It's a type of a culture
Where there are rules of
behaviour and ways of talking.
You don't jump the
chain of command.
Don't and that's
insulting to go up to
Someone higher and ask directly.
You're supposed to
coordinate all your questions.
-Are you going to risk
your career in nasa
By standing up and arguing
with the chain of command?
-You don't talk bluntly
or pose questions like that
To a nasa manager.
-Because that can
be very career limiting
And you find yourself shuffled
off into a windowless room,
Just going through paperwork.
-I want the system I want the
nasa manager culture confronted.
♪
-Good afternoon,
everybody, and welcome
To the johnson space center
For today's briefing.
Again, joining me is
Shuttle program
manager ron dittemore.
-Today I brought with
me a piece of foam,
And I think we've made
some foam available to you
So that you can
get an understanding
Of the composition
of this material.
It's very lightweight,
which is logical.
You would want
it to be lightweight
Because the more
weight you put on the tank,
The less upmass you
could launch into an orbit.
So, it's difficult for us
to believe as engineers,
As management and as a team,
That this particular piece
of foam debris shedding
From the tank represented
a safety of flight issue.
-I caught some
segment that ron got into
In which he said in
a declarative voice
-Right now, it just does
not make sense to us
That a piece of debris
Would be the root cause
For the loss of
columbia and its crew.
There's got to be
another reason.
-Well, how can he say that?
Where is he getting that from?
What a big denial.
-To be certain it was
foam is nonsense, right?
But to be certain it wasn't
foam is equally nonsense.
Right? And that's
what they were saying.
"it's not foam." well,
how do you know?
-I know from
The accident investigation
team's perspective,
No one was gonna go public
And say, "we know
what didn't happen."
-You get that shot right there?
That's a nasa official.
He's holding a piece of foam,
Which he is now saying
Could not have had enough impact
'cause it's too light to
have damaged those tiles
That we've been talking about.
-I knew ron. I had
respect for ron.
Ron was linda ham's boss
And a good manager.
But what's always
the first step in grief?
Denial.
-I called ron and I said,
"ron, let me just
remind you, ok?
We had a clear understanding
That we are not gonna
eliminate anything
Until the data has come in
To definitively eliminate it."
-To bring that out
And dismiss it, you
know, pre-emptively,
I think speaks volumes.
At the very least they
had to acknowledge it.
But it was acknowledging
their own mistakes
And that's hard to do.
♪
-Each week there
was a new trailer load
Of debris showed up,
Came right in this hangar
through those doors,
And it would be catalogued
and then put out on the floor.
I want to know what
the debris is telling us,
I want to know what the
aerodynamics are telling us,
And I want to know what
the sensors are telling us.
You follow the debris,
what's it telling you?
♪
And if you follow the logic,
You begin to see pieces
that are telling you a story.
As we were progressing through
the left-wing reconstruction,
You can see these burned tiles,
This reinforced carbon-carbon,
Looks like it's been burned
In a way that's very
different than everything else.
All of that data pointed to
a problem at rcc panel 8.
Something very different
Happened in this
location on the orbiter.
And so, let's go see if we
can understand what that was.
-Ok, so, as the vehicle is
entering the atmosphere,
These black tiles are
protecting the structure,
The aluminium of the
vehicle, in high-heat areas.
And the grey is the
wing leading edge
Reinforced
carbon-carbon, rcc panels.
Those protect the vehicle
from the highest level of heat,
Those 3,000 degree temperatures,
So that you don't
get metal melting.
But we had never had any
experience in breaking a panel.
-What was starting to join up
was you've got video analysis
That says the
strike on the orbiter
Created a hole in the wing.
And you can see
that there had been
Some sort of penetration
Against the rcc panel.
Hot gas had entered in,
The shuttle had lost
aerodynamic control and crashed.
But I think the challenge
for a lot of folks at nasa
Was believing that
foam had done that.
They would say foam can't
break reinforced carbon-carbon.
There were a lot of people
that said there's something else
That explains this.
-We decided to ask nasa
about the history of foam strikes,
Which had never been done.
-I was asked by the
accident investigation team
To help find that
type of information.
I went through a database,
There's a historical database
of all the space shuttle missions,
From the very first shuttle
mission up until that day.
I called the investigators
And I said, "you're
not gonna believe this.
Take a look at this."
♪
-I was shocked to find
That there were over a
half a dozen occurrences
Of foam strikes recorded.
So, we turned that in into
the investigation board.
-1983 was the first
bipod ramp foam loss.
1990, 1992,
'92 again, 1994.
As well as those bigger pieces,
We saw small pieces of foam
Fall away all the time.
What we call "popcorning".
When popcorn pops, it
pops up and comes out
And so that's what
we call it, popcorning.
They weren't very big
so you're not talking about
Much damage to the tiles.
And so, it had become
the norm at nasa.
This mantra "it's only foam,
It's only foam.
Hey, we see foam
loss all the time.
And it never did any
damage to the vehicle.
We don't have to worry about it,
It's only foam."
Two missions before columbia
it happened on sts-112 atlantis.
A significant
strike hit the skirt
Of the solid rocket booster
and actually put a dent in it.
-Prior till the
launch of columbia,
And a couple of the meetings,
The topic of foam
coming off 112 came up.
There's probably, erm
15 to 20 people around the table
And then there's a lot of other
people at nasa in the room.
We talked about starting to
look into this a little bit more
Because we've seen it
come off on, you know,
More than one flight now.
We should understand if
there's a way to prevent it.
-Late October of 2002,
after sts-112 atlantis,
I went to a meeting
about that flight.
I had put together a
report about the foam loss
And the damage to
the solid rocket booster.
And I presented
the case that said,
"that amount of foam,
That mass,
In one chunk coming
off shuttle atlantis
This was the vehicle telling
us something is wrong,
Here's your warning."
At risk of being insubordinate,
I said to the heads
of the shuttle program
Sitting around the centre table,
I was adamant at that meeting,
"either fix the problem
Or don't fly an external
tank on the next launch,
Which is impossible."
From that meeting,
I never heard any discussion of
"let's get a better
understanding of this
Before we schedule
the next launch."
-In other words, again,
they were thinking
It was more of a
turnaround issue.
And so, it wasn't
preventing shuttle flights
From going forward.
-The pressure on the management
team to stay on schedule
And the concept
of, "it's just foam"
Is leading the charge
through all of this.
-So, it wasn't like they weren't
talking about issues at all,
But there certainly was a big
focus on the on the schedule.
-Here's an e-mail, it's
Tuesday January 21st,
This was sent six days
into the columbia mission.
This is a private
exchange between
Linda ham and ron dittemore,
Two of the top
managers in the program.
"the rationale for flight
for the sts-112 loss of foam
Was lousy.
The rationale states, 'we
haven't changed anything,
We haven't
experienced any safety
Of flight damage
in 112 flights.'"
The concluding sentence
"the rationale was
lousy then and it still is"
What I take that to mean is that
Linda ham is raising a concern,
But they appear to rely on
the fact that previous flights
Which had suffered
this foam loss,
Had returned safely.
In other words, "we've
gotten away with this".
This is a failure to learn
from past similar events,
Simply because those flights
Did not have catastrophic
consequences.
The classic the classic
normalisation of deviance.
-You have to make sure
That every incident is
thoroughly investigated
And properly assessed.
And that wasn't done
for the 112 foam loss.
-People were saying they
were willing to accept the risk.
What they didn't understand is
How much risk
they were accepting.
After the 112 loss,
people were starting to say,
"maybe we're
accepting too much risk."
-We should have
never launched columbia
Until we fixed that problem.
-Yeah, I was
concerned, you know?
We were moving
in the right direction,
We just didn't
get there in time.
♪
-Good afternoon,
everybody, and welcome to
The johnson space
center for today's briefing.
♪
-Lisa starke with abc news.
When you realized
that you had this debris
That had struck the shuttle
and you started your analysis,
What was the discussion
about trying to take a look
Either through satellites
or these large telescopes
That the military has and
why was the decision made
Not to try that?
-We certainly had
that discussion.
We believe that
taking a picture ,
Looking for tile damage,
It does not show
us the depth of tile
That may have been shaved off.
We cannot make a
determination conclusively
Whether that represents
a concern or not.
- Well, linda, reading
through the transcripts,
In hindsight were you
sufficiently open to the idea
That this was a really
serious problem?
-You're asking 20/20
hindsight or what
What my thought was then?
-Well, it sounds like
you were just kind of
Seeking reassurance
that everything was ok,
As opposed to
digging in and saying,
'how do we know this? '
-I didn't have a preconceived
notion on the damage
Or the possible consequences,
and I needed to wait for them
To complete their work.
-The best experts at
our disposal concluded
That it was a minor problem,
not a significant problem.
-And when you added all that up,
There was no
need to take pictures
To document any evidence
Because we believed
it to be superficial
And it to be a turnaround issue
And not a safety issue.
And so we we
didn't take any pictures.
-Had we known that there was
A catastrophic
situation on orbit,
We certainly would have
done everything we could.
-Absolutely.
-I
I'm not aware of anybody
else during the mission
Asking for a photo
request and when.
I only learned later
That there really were
People outside of our team
That were trying to
do something about it.
-I had no idea
what was happening
Because there was
no communication.
I'm not in the loop,
I'm not in the know,
Nobody's talking to each other,
So nobody knows what's going on.
-The problem that we
had in nasa culturally
At the time was people would
not speak up with their concerns.
It was the most anti-dissenting
opinion place that I know of.
People were scared
silly to speak up.
-Nasa is a series of fiefdoms,
And there isn't necessarily a
lot of exchange of knowledge
Across those silos,
you know, frankly,
The system is not designed
for good communication.
But that's not an excuse,
Because this foam problem
was a not a new problem.
It was ignored right
up until an opportunity
To intervene presented itself,
And then that opportunity
to get a spy satellite
To take a look was dismissed.
To sort of stick to your
guns of convincing yourself
That it's ok
It just made matters worse.
-I-I could I could
only deal with the data
That was presented to me.
The whole situation was a
case of people doing their jobs
As they understood them.
But I think everybody was
operating with good faith.
There was no, er
I wouldn't say
malfeasance, but negligence.
There may have been
I don't even think
there was negligence,
I just think that
the actions we took
Were inadequate for the
problem we were facing.
-I think there was a
mindset and sort of a hope
That we've seen
foam strikes before
And it's never caused
a safety of flight issue.
So, we're assuming
that's the case here,
But not a sure thing.
It seemed like by
staying ignorant
Of the degree of damage,
The mission management team
Perhaps didn't want to know
about the worst-case scenario.
-At this point, from
our work in the hangar,
I think we have
enough information
To say we found the physical
cause of the shuttle crash.
But there were
still people at nasa
Who didn't believe that foam
Could break reinforced
carbon-carbon.
-We're here at southwest
research institute
In san antonio,
texas, to conduct a test
To show whether foam
could create a hole big enough
To destroy the vehicle.
-Everything came
down to whether or not
The foam shot was
gonna break an rcc panel.
But if our investigative
analysis is wrong, then what?
-Five, four, three, two, one.
-Whoa!
[ indistinct chatter ]
♪
-Ok. Foam will break
reinforced carbon-carbon.
-I mean, there was no
doubt at that point, right?
Case closed.
There's no denying it.
You know, there was there
was foam falling from day one.
They should have had
that test on day two.
-This was a known failure.
But I think the failure
to imagine being wrong,
The failure to imagine
the consequences of failure
Were catastrophic.
And I think it's this
whole notion of the failure
To imagine failure.
-Nasa's trying to move forward
After Tuesday's
blistering report,
Blaming it for
failing to prevent
The shuttle columbia tragedy.
-Nasa stands accused
of complacency
Of a flawed safety culture
Of major management failures.
Technical failures, but
also about a human failure.
-Nasa had conflicting
goals of cost,
Schedule, and safety.
It's our view that clearly
there is still evidence
Of a silent safety program
with echoes of challenger.
-They knew about the foam,
They could take pictures,
and people chose not to.
Felt almost like they
had betrayed him.
-Why?
Why?
The only reason
Was because of the way
They made decisions
within that culture.
-I felt angry. I mean, I just
Was extremely disappointed.
-Pure grief and sadness
turned into anger and disgust.
It kind of became this
inner struggle in me of,
"how can I hate this thing
that my dad loved so much?"
♪
-Well, it goes without
saying that we were all trying
To do the right thing all along.
We were basing our decisions
On the best information
that we had at the time.
Nobody wanted to do
any harm to anyone.
-If a bunch of things
went really right
And they identified
very early on
And got images early on
And everything
went about perfectly,
Just maybe
There could have
been a rescue mission.
But it's questionable whether
you could get the other orbiter,
Which would have
been atlantis in this case,
Processed and out
to the pad in time
Without putting that
crew at serious risk.
We would have had to
pull together this huge effort
In the eleventh hour
to figure out how to fly
One shuttle next to the other
To conduct an operation
That you'd never
trained or prepared for.
It was not in the
art of the possible
Given what we knew.
-The one tool we could
have tried to look at
Was changing the
way entry is done,
Trying to change how it
enters the atmosphere.
You can change the
angle of attack coming in
So you can lessen
the heat in certain areas
By moving to the other side
and then come back again.
-We can do all the "woulda,
shoulda" all day long here.
That's easy.
When you actually have to
make the decisions real time,
You're doing some
really complicated stuff.
That's a lot harder.
-I think that rick would
have wanted to have known
Something was very
wrong with the vehicle,
So he could have the
opportunity to repair something
Or fix something.
But at the same time,
there was also a trust
That nasa would look
out for their best interest.
-In terms of a hypothetical
And I think other
people in senior levels
That probably felt
the same way
If we knew that the crew
wasn't gonna survive,
Why would we tell them?
Why wouldn't we let them
just carry out their mission
And feel like they were
successful you know?
-The thing I can't get
past is, if we had of known
That entry was going to
cause loss of the vehicle
And loss of the crew,
there are things we can do
As human beings.
And that is for the families,
The chance to be
able to say goodbye.
That wasn't afforded to anyone.
And that's always haunted me.
Sorry.
♪
-Yes, there were individuals
who made very poor decisions.
You need to embrace
dissenting opinions,
And if somebody says,
"hey, let's get better data
To make a decision,"
Why is getting better
data a-a problem?
But, I mean, I was
in mission control.
I was a nasa employee. I
knew about the foam strike.
When there's
blame that's laid out,
I am right up there
saying I knew.
And I and I wish I could've
done something differently.
But I-I can't undo that.
And it you can just make
it better for those that follow.
-I feel ashamed.
So, who's guilty?
I'm not just gonna say
The program managers are.
We're all guilty.
If you don't speak up
for your own system
And you're the victims
of this environment,
We're guilty, too.
-During the mission, I could
have easily done a story
Saying, "this thing happened.
While nasa is
saying it's nothing,
Some engineers believe
there may be some concern."
What if I had done that?
I was the one who could have
Should have and could have
Owned that story in a way
That potentially even
might have changed
The course of events.
I definitely failed at my job.
Just like they failed at theirs.
And so, I'm part of the problem.
[ applause ]
- ladies and gentlemen,
The president of
the united states.
- In 2010, the space shuttle,
After nearly 30 years of duty,
Will be retired from service.
-The minute columbia
evaporated over texas,
The shuttle program
was ready to be retired.
That's when I felt like,
"wow, was all this in vain?
No more shuttle
program. They died.
What did he what
did they accomplish?"
There was not a lot
positive at that point in time.
-The legacy of
columbia must carry on.
The shuttle's chief purpose
over the next several years
Will be to help finish assembly
Of the international
space station.
-This could easily
have just stopped cold,
But we made a decision to
continue this exploration quest
That they just
gave their lives for.
-2, 1. Booster ignition
And lift off of the
space shuttle discovery
Returning to the space station
Paving the way for
future missions beyond.
-I was very quickly
assigned to the second return
To flight mission sts-121.
-Steve lindsey joined
on the flight deck
By pilot mark kelly,
headed for six months
On the international
space station.
-You know, certainly one
of the legacies of columbia
And the entire
space shuttle program
Is we learned how
to more safely fly
The shuttle to
honour its commitment
As part of the
international space station.
-For that mission
we did space walks
To practise
repairing tile outside,
To repair the leading
edge of the wing,
The reinforced carbon-carbon.
We developed techniques
To make sure that
we had the ability
To repair the space shuttle
If we find another hole
in the wing or the tile.
♪
-Atlantis, welcome to the
international space station
For the last time.
-The shuttle had at long
last served its purpose,
In building the space station.
But, as time went
on, it was evident
It was time to move
onto something else.
And frankly something
with a fundamental redesign.
-Having fired the
imagination of a generation,
Its place in history secured,
The space shuttle pulls
into port for the last time
It's voyage at an end.
-The idea of the us not
having its own capability
To fly to space
again was looming.
And I think if you
took that away,
We would feel as if we'd
lost something meaningful
And really central to
our national identity.
The question for nasa was
What happens next?
♪
-And here we go.
5. Core stage engine start
3, 2, 1
Boosters and ignition.
And lift off of artemis 1.
We rise together back
to the moon and beyond.
♪
-By going back to the moon
and eventually onto mars,
We can honour our fallen
crew members from columbia
And their families.
-Artemis is a new rocket
and a new space craft
To send humans to the moon.
As the mission management
team chair for artemis 1,
I took lessons learned
From the columbia
accident investigation report
And used that to
guide the structure
Of the mission management team
To ensure we could
hear dissenting opinions
And other information
was being communicated
In spite of potential management
or communication challenges.
It's tragic we had to go through
The columbia
accident to get here.
So, I always remind
myself of what's at stake
If we don't retain
those lessons.
-As always, nasa's
arrow is pointed up
Towards the stars
as it should be.
It's about the united states ,
And our partners,
remaining the leaders
In aerospace technology
and exploration.
Here in the united
states senate,
I've got a little say on
some of these programs,
And I'm trying to make sure
that nasa has the resources
It needs to fly people in
space as safely as possible.
American astronauts
flying on american rockets
From american soil
into space once again.
It's a very exciting time
for our space program.
Sending people into
space is dangerous.
More dangerous than most things.
It's one of the riskiest things
that people have ever done.
-To be able to experience
this incredible career
Of being an astronaut
was something
That we always
called a calculated risk.
Rick died doing something that
he was very passionate about.
In the end, I had to very
purposely make a decision
That this was not
gonna be something
That was gonna define
me for the rest of my life.
I didn't want to go down
that path of "it's your fault
Or your fault, or
I'm angry about this
And I can't let go of it."
None of that was a path
I wanted to go on at all.
I want to be a great mom
And I want to be productive
And not just be
stuck in that one spot.
And god has been very
merciful to help me with that
Just to be able to
keep moving forward.
-I was angry that my mom
chose to take that risk
Instead of staying with me.
And I know it's
probably a great benefit
To the scientific community
And maybe a
small risk of failure,
But it's still kind of painful.
-Daddy, I'm here!
-Hi!
-Oh, my gosh.
It's crazy over here, right?
-[ giggles ]
-You need your sunglasses?
Try 'em on.
This is laurel, and
she's my daughter.
She has a lot of
my mom's spirit.
The same enthusiasm
and positivity.
♪
I imagine
It would be harder if she
wasn't such a great kid.
So, I got pretty lucky there.
♪
-Nasa has released video footage
Taken inside the cockpit
Of the space shuttle columbia.
It was recorded in
the final moments
Before the shuttle broke up.
The last part of the tape
was burnt up in the accident.
-It's years since the accident,
And I've kind of
reframed the way
That I look at nasa as a whole.
I forgive them.
And that my family
forgives them.
I think I still feel a
little bit ambivalent
About the future of
space exploration.
Part of me kind of wants
to keep my distance.
But I realise my dad
died doing what he loved.
And there's still kind
of that little bit in me
That if I got the
chance to go to space,
I think I can't pass
up the opportunity
To see what he saw.
It would just be so moving
To kind of put
myself in his shoes.
♪
♪
♪
-For the second
time in nasa's history,
A space shuttle has been
lost along with its entire crew.
Once again, we
are asking ourselves,
How could this have happened?
-Do you have any
idea how big that
Piece of foam was that came off?
-We'd heard some
reports that during launch
There had been some
concerns that some debris
Hit the wing.
Is that true and is that
any cause of concern
And that could have
caused today's problems?
-It is true.
It was judged that, erm ,
That event did not
represent a safety concern.
-This happened under my watch,
But I didn't have the answers.
In every public forum
I'm gonna have to be in,
How am I gonna
explain this to anybody?
At this time, we
have no indication
That the mishap was
caused by anything
Or anyone on the ground.
-Nasa never
wants to look stupid.
Nasa wants to be the
agency with the answers.
-My thoughts are
on what we missed,
What I missed
To allow this to happen.
-But if you overlook something,
It will come to bite
you one day or another.
♪
♪
-I was playing tennis
in mclean, virginia.
I received a phone call saying
That I would be
flown immediately
To barksdale air force base.
After challenger,
Nasa had a
contingency plan in case
There was a shuttle accident.
I never really imagined
that it would happen.
With columbia, we had
people who had experience
With accident investigation
from the military,
Navy, and air force on the team.
-I came to the investigation
as a helicopter pilot
Who knew something about
doing accident investigations.
I did not come to
the investigation
As a space shuttle expert.
I literally knew nothing about
How the shuttle
was put together.
We needed nasa's help
because by definition,
Everybody who came
in as an external part
Of the investigation team
is not a space shuttle expert.
There was years of
shuttle program knowledge
That we needed to
learn very quickly.
-There's that issue
of the falling foam
During the launch of
space shuttle columbia.
-Very early on nasa told us
That they knew about
a foam a debris event.
But we didn't even know
enough about the shuttle
To understand that there
was foam on the tanks.
The press wants to
know what happened
And it's like,
"yep, so do we."
-It's a mammoth job for those
taking part in a mammoth task.
-Covering many
hundreds of square miles.
-It's the largest
recovery effort
That has ever been
attempted in this country.
-As an investigator,
I wanted as ironclad a case
As we could possibly
have for the sequence
Of events leading to
the cause of the crash
Of space shuttle columbia.
But if we were going to do that,
We needed to
collect all the debris
And reconstruct the shuttle.
-1,200 sites have
been identified.
-All those pieces of
columbia will be brought
To the kennedy space center,
Where it will be reassembled
In a manner of speaking.
-Really thousands
of pieces of debris
Are now pieces to a puzzle.
♪
-Under a crisp texas sky,
Thousands of
mourners are gathering,
Including that man,
neil armstrong ,
As nasa gathers to say
farewell to seven of its own.
-Knowing that I wasn't
gonna see my dad again
And losing that many people
That you love and that
you're close to all at once.
It was just so heavy.
The world just
became a scary place.
-Just felt like I
was so, like
Raw, just so Exposed.
-To have your dad
die in a public way,
And you have press
focused in on you.
I knew I didn't
want to be there.
-Just like a feeling of, like,
How are we supposed to act?
-The grief is heavy.
Our nation shares
in your sorrow.
And in your pride.
-This isn't my
own personal loss.
You kind of realise that
this this is a public story,
A national grieving.
Everybody felt like they
lost something of theirs.
-In your grief, you
are responding
As your friends
would have wished,
With focus, professionalism,
and unbroken faith
In the mission of this agency.
The people of nasa are
being tested once again.
-I could see outside
the window all the crowd.
I had my suit and tie on.
And I said to myself,
"I'm gonna go outside,"
And then I couldn't.
I just shut the door,
Locked it, and I just
sobbed at my desk.
The president's talking
outside, and I was just sobbing,
And sobbing, and sobbing.
Inside johnson space center,
The internal
conflict was building.
-On the first day
that we went in,
There were people who
received us very well,
There were people who were
not happy that we were here.
-I was one of the first people
To be interviewed
and interrogated.
I felt ok, I felt like,
"this is a good thing,
This has to happen. I
hope they're thorough."
-I think the folks
that were probably
Less interested in our help
Were more at the
management level in nasa.
In some cases,
we're asking for data,
And then they'd be
like, "I can't give you
That information right
now, you're gonna have to
Go up through a very formal
Nasa chain of command
to be approved."
-I call it the managers' club.
It's a type of a culture
Where there are rules of
behaviour and ways of talking.
You don't jump the
chain of command.
Don't and that's
insulting to go up to
Someone higher and ask directly.
You're supposed to
coordinate all your questions.
-Are you going to risk
your career in nasa
By standing up and arguing
with the chain of command?
-You don't talk bluntly
or pose questions like that
To a nasa manager.
-Because that can
be very career limiting
And you find yourself shuffled
off into a windowless room,
Just going through paperwork.
-I want the system I want the
nasa manager culture confronted.
♪
-Good afternoon,
everybody, and welcome
To the johnson space center
For today's briefing.
Again, joining me is
Shuttle program
manager ron dittemore.
-Today I brought with
me a piece of foam,
And I think we've made
some foam available to you
So that you can
get an understanding
Of the composition
of this material.
It's very lightweight,
which is logical.
You would want
it to be lightweight
Because the more
weight you put on the tank,
The less upmass you
could launch into an orbit.
So, it's difficult for us
to believe as engineers,
As management and as a team,
That this particular piece
of foam debris shedding
From the tank represented
a safety of flight issue.
-I caught some
segment that ron got into
In which he said in
a declarative voice
-Right now, it just does
not make sense to us
That a piece of debris
Would be the root cause
For the loss of
columbia and its crew.
There's got to be
another reason.
-Well, how can he say that?
Where is he getting that from?
What a big denial.
-To be certain it was
foam is nonsense, right?
But to be certain it wasn't
foam is equally nonsense.
Right? And that's
what they were saying.
"it's not foam." well,
how do you know?
-I know from
The accident investigation
team's perspective,
No one was gonna go public
And say, "we know
what didn't happen."
-You get that shot right there?
That's a nasa official.
He's holding a piece of foam,
Which he is now saying
Could not have had enough impact
'cause it's too light to
have damaged those tiles
That we've been talking about.
-I knew ron. I had
respect for ron.
Ron was linda ham's boss
And a good manager.
But what's always
the first step in grief?
Denial.
-I called ron and I said,
"ron, let me just
remind you, ok?
We had a clear understanding
That we are not gonna
eliminate anything
Until the data has come in
To definitively eliminate it."
-To bring that out
And dismiss it, you
know, pre-emptively,
I think speaks volumes.
At the very least they
had to acknowledge it.
But it was acknowledging
their own mistakes
And that's hard to do.
♪
-Each week there
was a new trailer load
Of debris showed up,
Came right in this hangar
through those doors,
And it would be catalogued
and then put out on the floor.
I want to know what
the debris is telling us,
I want to know what the
aerodynamics are telling us,
And I want to know what
the sensors are telling us.
You follow the debris,
what's it telling you?
♪
And if you follow the logic,
You begin to see pieces
that are telling you a story.
As we were progressing through
the left-wing reconstruction,
You can see these burned tiles,
This reinforced carbon-carbon,
Looks like it's been burned
In a way that's very
different than everything else.
All of that data pointed to
a problem at rcc panel 8.
Something very different
Happened in this
location on the orbiter.
And so, let's go see if we
can understand what that was.
-Ok, so, as the vehicle is
entering the atmosphere,
These black tiles are
protecting the structure,
The aluminium of the
vehicle, in high-heat areas.
And the grey is the
wing leading edge
Reinforced
carbon-carbon, rcc panels.
Those protect the vehicle
from the highest level of heat,
Those 3,000 degree temperatures,
So that you don't
get metal melting.
But we had never had any
experience in breaking a panel.
-What was starting to join up
was you've got video analysis
That says the
strike on the orbiter
Created a hole in the wing.
And you can see
that there had been
Some sort of penetration
Against the rcc panel.
Hot gas had entered in,
The shuttle had lost
aerodynamic control and crashed.
But I think the challenge
for a lot of folks at nasa
Was believing that
foam had done that.
They would say foam can't
break reinforced carbon-carbon.
There were a lot of people
that said there's something else
That explains this.
-We decided to ask nasa
about the history of foam strikes,
Which had never been done.
-I was asked by the
accident investigation team
To help find that
type of information.
I went through a database,
There's a historical database
of all the space shuttle missions,
From the very first shuttle
mission up until that day.
I called the investigators
And I said, "you're
not gonna believe this.
Take a look at this."
♪
-I was shocked to find
That there were over a
half a dozen occurrences
Of foam strikes recorded.
So, we turned that in into
the investigation board.
-1983 was the first
bipod ramp foam loss.
1990, 1992,
'92 again, 1994.
As well as those bigger pieces,
We saw small pieces of foam
Fall away all the time.
What we call "popcorning".
When popcorn pops, it
pops up and comes out
And so that's what
we call it, popcorning.
They weren't very big
so you're not talking about
Much damage to the tiles.
And so, it had become
the norm at nasa.
This mantra "it's only foam,
It's only foam.
Hey, we see foam
loss all the time.
And it never did any
damage to the vehicle.
We don't have to worry about it,
It's only foam."
Two missions before columbia
it happened on sts-112 atlantis.
A significant
strike hit the skirt
Of the solid rocket booster
and actually put a dent in it.
-Prior till the
launch of columbia,
And a couple of the meetings,
The topic of foam
coming off 112 came up.
There's probably, erm
15 to 20 people around the table
And then there's a lot of other
people at nasa in the room.
We talked about starting to
look into this a little bit more
Because we've seen it
come off on, you know,
More than one flight now.
We should understand if
there's a way to prevent it.
-Late October of 2002,
after sts-112 atlantis,
I went to a meeting
about that flight.
I had put together a
report about the foam loss
And the damage to
the solid rocket booster.
And I presented
the case that said,
"that amount of foam,
That mass,
In one chunk coming
off shuttle atlantis
This was the vehicle telling
us something is wrong,
Here's your warning."
At risk of being insubordinate,
I said to the heads
of the shuttle program
Sitting around the centre table,
I was adamant at that meeting,
"either fix the problem
Or don't fly an external
tank on the next launch,
Which is impossible."
From that meeting,
I never heard any discussion of
"let's get a better
understanding of this
Before we schedule
the next launch."
-In other words, again,
they were thinking
It was more of a
turnaround issue.
And so, it wasn't
preventing shuttle flights
From going forward.
-The pressure on the management
team to stay on schedule
And the concept
of, "it's just foam"
Is leading the charge
through all of this.
-So, it wasn't like they weren't
talking about issues at all,
But there certainly was a big
focus on the on the schedule.
-Here's an e-mail, it's
Tuesday January 21st,
This was sent six days
into the columbia mission.
This is a private
exchange between
Linda ham and ron dittemore,
Two of the top
managers in the program.
"the rationale for flight
for the sts-112 loss of foam
Was lousy.
The rationale states, 'we
haven't changed anything,
We haven't
experienced any safety
Of flight damage
in 112 flights.'"
The concluding sentence
"the rationale was
lousy then and it still is"
What I take that to mean is that
Linda ham is raising a concern,
But they appear to rely on
the fact that previous flights
Which had suffered
this foam loss,
Had returned safely.
In other words, "we've
gotten away with this".
This is a failure to learn
from past similar events,
Simply because those flights
Did not have catastrophic
consequences.
The classic the classic
normalisation of deviance.
-You have to make sure
That every incident is
thoroughly investigated
And properly assessed.
And that wasn't done
for the 112 foam loss.
-People were saying they
were willing to accept the risk.
What they didn't understand is
How much risk
they were accepting.
After the 112 loss,
people were starting to say,
"maybe we're
accepting too much risk."
-We should have
never launched columbia
Until we fixed that problem.
-Yeah, I was
concerned, you know?
We were moving
in the right direction,
We just didn't
get there in time.
♪
-Good afternoon,
everybody, and welcome to
The johnson space
center for today's briefing.
♪
-Lisa starke with abc news.
When you realized
that you had this debris
That had struck the shuttle
and you started your analysis,
What was the discussion
about trying to take a look
Either through satellites
or these large telescopes
That the military has and
why was the decision made
Not to try that?
-We certainly had
that discussion.
We believe that
taking a picture ,
Looking for tile damage,
It does not show
us the depth of tile
That may have been shaved off.
We cannot make a
determination conclusively
Whether that represents
a concern or not.
- Well, linda, reading
through the transcripts,
In hindsight were you
sufficiently open to the idea
That this was a really
serious problem?
-You're asking 20/20
hindsight or what
What my thought was then?
-Well, it sounds like
you were just kind of
Seeking reassurance
that everything was ok,
As opposed to
digging in and saying,
'how do we know this? '
-I didn't have a preconceived
notion on the damage
Or the possible consequences,
and I needed to wait for them
To complete their work.
-The best experts at
our disposal concluded
That it was a minor problem,
not a significant problem.
-And when you added all that up,
There was no
need to take pictures
To document any evidence
Because we believed
it to be superficial
And it to be a turnaround issue
And not a safety issue.
And so we we
didn't take any pictures.
-Had we known that there was
A catastrophic
situation on orbit,
We certainly would have
done everything we could.
-Absolutely.
-I
I'm not aware of anybody
else during the mission
Asking for a photo
request and when.
I only learned later
That there really were
People outside of our team
That were trying to
do something about it.
-I had no idea
what was happening
Because there was
no communication.
I'm not in the loop,
I'm not in the know,
Nobody's talking to each other,
So nobody knows what's going on.
-The problem that we
had in nasa culturally
At the time was people would
not speak up with their concerns.
It was the most anti-dissenting
opinion place that I know of.
People were scared
silly to speak up.
-Nasa is a series of fiefdoms,
And there isn't necessarily a
lot of exchange of knowledge
Across those silos,
you know, frankly,
The system is not designed
for good communication.
But that's not an excuse,
Because this foam problem
was a not a new problem.
It was ignored right
up until an opportunity
To intervene presented itself,
And then that opportunity
to get a spy satellite
To take a look was dismissed.
To sort of stick to your
guns of convincing yourself
That it's ok
It just made matters worse.
-I-I could I could
only deal with the data
That was presented to me.
The whole situation was a
case of people doing their jobs
As they understood them.
But I think everybody was
operating with good faith.
There was no, er
I wouldn't say
malfeasance, but negligence.
There may have been
I don't even think
there was negligence,
I just think that
the actions we took
Were inadequate for the
problem we were facing.
-I think there was a
mindset and sort of a hope
That we've seen
foam strikes before
And it's never caused
a safety of flight issue.
So, we're assuming
that's the case here,
But not a sure thing.
It seemed like by
staying ignorant
Of the degree of damage,
The mission management team
Perhaps didn't want to know
about the worst-case scenario.
-At this point, from
our work in the hangar,
I think we have
enough information
To say we found the physical
cause of the shuttle crash.
But there were
still people at nasa
Who didn't believe that foam
Could break reinforced
carbon-carbon.
-We're here at southwest
research institute
In san antonio,
texas, to conduct a test
To show whether foam
could create a hole big enough
To destroy the vehicle.
-Everything came
down to whether or not
The foam shot was
gonna break an rcc panel.
But if our investigative
analysis is wrong, then what?
-Five, four, three, two, one.
-Whoa!
[ indistinct chatter ]
♪
-Ok. Foam will break
reinforced carbon-carbon.
-I mean, there was no
doubt at that point, right?
Case closed.
There's no denying it.
You know, there was there
was foam falling from day one.
They should have had
that test on day two.
-This was a known failure.
But I think the failure
to imagine being wrong,
The failure to imagine
the consequences of failure
Were catastrophic.
And I think it's this
whole notion of the failure
To imagine failure.
-Nasa's trying to move forward
After Tuesday's
blistering report,
Blaming it for
failing to prevent
The shuttle columbia tragedy.
-Nasa stands accused
of complacency
Of a flawed safety culture
Of major management failures.
Technical failures, but
also about a human failure.
-Nasa had conflicting
goals of cost,
Schedule, and safety.
It's our view that clearly
there is still evidence
Of a silent safety program
with echoes of challenger.
-They knew about the foam,
They could take pictures,
and people chose not to.
Felt almost like they
had betrayed him.
-Why?
Why?
The only reason
Was because of the way
They made decisions
within that culture.
-I felt angry. I mean, I just
Was extremely disappointed.
-Pure grief and sadness
turned into anger and disgust.
It kind of became this
inner struggle in me of,
"how can I hate this thing
that my dad loved so much?"
♪
-Well, it goes without
saying that we were all trying
To do the right thing all along.
We were basing our decisions
On the best information
that we had at the time.
Nobody wanted to do
any harm to anyone.
-If a bunch of things
went really right
And they identified
very early on
And got images early on
And everything
went about perfectly,
Just maybe
There could have
been a rescue mission.
But it's questionable whether
you could get the other orbiter,
Which would have
been atlantis in this case,
Processed and out
to the pad in time
Without putting that
crew at serious risk.
We would have had to
pull together this huge effort
In the eleventh hour
to figure out how to fly
One shuttle next to the other
To conduct an operation
That you'd never
trained or prepared for.
It was not in the
art of the possible
Given what we knew.
-The one tool we could
have tried to look at
Was changing the
way entry is done,
Trying to change how it
enters the atmosphere.
You can change the
angle of attack coming in
So you can lessen
the heat in certain areas
By moving to the other side
and then come back again.
-We can do all the "woulda,
shoulda" all day long here.
That's easy.
When you actually have to
make the decisions real time,
You're doing some
really complicated stuff.
That's a lot harder.
-I think that rick would
have wanted to have known
Something was very
wrong with the vehicle,
So he could have the
opportunity to repair something
Or fix something.
But at the same time,
there was also a trust
That nasa would look
out for their best interest.
-In terms of a hypothetical
And I think other
people in senior levels
That probably felt
the same way
If we knew that the crew
wasn't gonna survive,
Why would we tell them?
Why wouldn't we let them
just carry out their mission
And feel like they were
successful you know?
-The thing I can't get
past is, if we had of known
That entry was going to
cause loss of the vehicle
And loss of the crew,
there are things we can do
As human beings.
And that is for the families,
The chance to be
able to say goodbye.
That wasn't afforded to anyone.
And that's always haunted me.
Sorry.
♪
-Yes, there were individuals
who made very poor decisions.
You need to embrace
dissenting opinions,
And if somebody says,
"hey, let's get better data
To make a decision,"
Why is getting better
data a-a problem?
But, I mean, I was
in mission control.
I was a nasa employee. I
knew about the foam strike.
When there's
blame that's laid out,
I am right up there
saying I knew.
And I and I wish I could've
done something differently.
But I-I can't undo that.
And it you can just make
it better for those that follow.
-I feel ashamed.
So, who's guilty?
I'm not just gonna say
The program managers are.
We're all guilty.
If you don't speak up
for your own system
And you're the victims
of this environment,
We're guilty, too.
-During the mission, I could
have easily done a story
Saying, "this thing happened.
While nasa is
saying it's nothing,
Some engineers believe
there may be some concern."
What if I had done that?
I was the one who could have
Should have and could have
Owned that story in a way
That potentially even
might have changed
The course of events.
I definitely failed at my job.
Just like they failed at theirs.
And so, I'm part of the problem.
[ applause ]
- ladies and gentlemen,
The president of
the united states.
- In 2010, the space shuttle,
After nearly 30 years of duty,
Will be retired from service.
-The minute columbia
evaporated over texas,
The shuttle program
was ready to be retired.
That's when I felt like,
"wow, was all this in vain?
No more shuttle
program. They died.
What did he what
did they accomplish?"
There was not a lot
positive at that point in time.
-The legacy of
columbia must carry on.
The shuttle's chief purpose
over the next several years
Will be to help finish assembly
Of the international
space station.
-This could easily
have just stopped cold,
But we made a decision to
continue this exploration quest
That they just
gave their lives for.
-2, 1. Booster ignition
And lift off of the
space shuttle discovery
Returning to the space station
Paving the way for
future missions beyond.
-I was very quickly
assigned to the second return
To flight mission sts-121.
-Steve lindsey joined
on the flight deck
By pilot mark kelly,
headed for six months
On the international
space station.
-You know, certainly one
of the legacies of columbia
And the entire
space shuttle program
Is we learned how
to more safely fly
The shuttle to
honour its commitment
As part of the
international space station.
-For that mission
we did space walks
To practise
repairing tile outside,
To repair the leading
edge of the wing,
The reinforced carbon-carbon.
We developed techniques
To make sure that
we had the ability
To repair the space shuttle
If we find another hole
in the wing or the tile.
♪
-Atlantis, welcome to the
international space station
For the last time.
-The shuttle had at long
last served its purpose,
In building the space station.
But, as time went
on, it was evident
It was time to move
onto something else.
And frankly something
with a fundamental redesign.
-Having fired the
imagination of a generation,
Its place in history secured,
The space shuttle pulls
into port for the last time
It's voyage at an end.
-The idea of the us not
having its own capability
To fly to space
again was looming.
And I think if you
took that away,
We would feel as if we'd
lost something meaningful
And really central to
our national identity.
The question for nasa was
What happens next?
♪
-And here we go.
5. Core stage engine start
3, 2, 1
Boosters and ignition.
And lift off of artemis 1.
We rise together back
to the moon and beyond.
♪
-By going back to the moon
and eventually onto mars,
We can honour our fallen
crew members from columbia
And their families.
-Artemis is a new rocket
and a new space craft
To send humans to the moon.
As the mission management
team chair for artemis 1,
I took lessons learned
From the columbia
accident investigation report
And used that to
guide the structure
Of the mission management team
To ensure we could
hear dissenting opinions
And other information
was being communicated
In spite of potential management
or communication challenges.
It's tragic we had to go through
The columbia
accident to get here.
So, I always remind
myself of what's at stake
If we don't retain
those lessons.
-As always, nasa's
arrow is pointed up
Towards the stars
as it should be.
It's about the united states ,
And our partners,
remaining the leaders
In aerospace technology
and exploration.
Here in the united
states senate,
I've got a little say on
some of these programs,
And I'm trying to make sure
that nasa has the resources
It needs to fly people in
space as safely as possible.
American astronauts
flying on american rockets
From american soil
into space once again.
It's a very exciting time
for our space program.
Sending people into
space is dangerous.
More dangerous than most things.
It's one of the riskiest things
that people have ever done.
-To be able to experience
this incredible career
Of being an astronaut
was something
That we always
called a calculated risk.
Rick died doing something that
he was very passionate about.
In the end, I had to very
purposely make a decision
That this was not
gonna be something
That was gonna define
me for the rest of my life.
I didn't want to go down
that path of "it's your fault
Or your fault, or
I'm angry about this
And I can't let go of it."
None of that was a path
I wanted to go on at all.
I want to be a great mom
And I want to be productive
And not just be
stuck in that one spot.
And god has been very
merciful to help me with that
Just to be able to
keep moving forward.
-I was angry that my mom
chose to take that risk
Instead of staying with me.
And I know it's
probably a great benefit
To the scientific community
And maybe a
small risk of failure,
But it's still kind of painful.
-Daddy, I'm here!
-Hi!
-Oh, my gosh.
It's crazy over here, right?
-[ giggles ]
-You need your sunglasses?
Try 'em on.
This is laurel, and
she's my daughter.
She has a lot of
my mom's spirit.
The same enthusiasm
and positivity.
♪
I imagine
It would be harder if she
wasn't such a great kid.
So, I got pretty lucky there.
♪
-Nasa has released video footage
Taken inside the cockpit
Of the space shuttle columbia.
It was recorded in
the final moments
Before the shuttle broke up.
The last part of the tape
was burnt up in the accident.
-It's years since the accident,
And I've kind of
reframed the way
That I look at nasa as a whole.
I forgive them.
And that my family
forgives them.
I think I still feel a
little bit ambivalent
About the future of
space exploration.
Part of me kind of wants
to keep my distance.
But I realise my dad
died doing what he loved.
And there's still kind
of that little bit in me
That if I got the
chance to go to space,
I think I can't pass
up the opportunity
To see what he saw.
It would just be so moving
To kind of put
myself in his shoes.
♪
♪