Spy Ops (2023) s01e07 Episode Script

The tragedy of September 11
once again tied the destinies
of our two nations.
You came to Afghanistan
to defeat terrorism,
and we Afghans welcomed and embraced you
for the liberation of our country.
Together, we ended the rule of terrorism.
The US-led campaign
with the Northern Alliance after 9/11
certainly disrupted
Osama bin Laden's network.
All the resources of the US government
was directed toward
stopping and killing him,
but he was still a potent threat.
The Taliban gravitated
towards the Pakistan border,
and they took a vow
to regenerate themselves and come back.
Taliban guy said, "We have our own drones
and our own cruise missiles,
and those are suicide bombers."
When you're up against an enemy
who is willing to explode themselves
and kill you,
that's absolutely terrifying.
They're brainwashed.
All they wanna do is die.
These suicide bombers agreed
that they would talk to
this Canadian journalist.
And, of course, the journalist was me.
Gary said, "Hey, I got this mission.
We're gonna go pick up 29 Taliban
and bring them back to Kabul."
Took a step back. "Is this legit?"
Your worst fear is that these people
who you think are your biggest prize
are, in fact, a sort of Trojan horse
to get inside your own operation
to kill you.
As soon as the Taliban government
had been toppled,
which was much swifter than many
in the US government had expected,
38 billion dollars poured in,
so there was a lot of reconstruction aid.
In US eyes,
the war in Afghanistan was over.
NATO allies and US diplomats,
rather than US war fighters,
could, uh, take charge in Afghanistan.
President of the United States
and General Franks
and I have been looking at the progress
that's being made in this country,
and in cooperation with President Karzai,
have concluded that
we're at a point
where we clearly have moved
from major combat activity
to a period of of stability
and stabilization and reconstruction.
It was this sense that America
was the world's only superpower
and could achieve anything.
They just achieved victory
in Afghanistan in two months.
Uh, and, uh, next stop, Baghdad.
At this hour,
American and coalition forces
are in the early stages
of military operations
to disarm Iraq,
to free its people,
and to defend the world from grave danger.
I think Osama bin Laden
and al-Qaeda
realized that the US was taking
its eye off the ball in Afghanistan
and, um, adjusted its plans accordingly.
Once bin Laden reached relative safety
and he, uh, built sort of a network
of couriers and people
who, uh, could transmit his messages,
he was able to, um, start to put
al-Qaeda back together again.
After what has happened,
all the important American officials,
headed by the international atheist Bush,
started turning
even Muslim countries against us.
They started a war against Islam
in the name of combatting terrorism.
I was a case officer
from the CIA serving in Afghanistan.
In 2005-8, the US military presence
was still building.
We were trying to develop
capabilities to fight Taliban
and to go after al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
We were opening bases
and improving on bases
that were in various locations
around Afghanistan.
Politically, the government stood up,
and they were trying to reach a normalcy,
and the US was helping the Afghans
try to establish control
and governance in Afghanistan.
I would say our efforts to grow
in counter-terror operations
and, uh and search for al-Qaeda
was on the increase at that time.
After 9/11, the agency
really offered good financial reward
for people to come in
and serve as interpreters,
and most of the people
that served as linguists were Afghans.
My name is Ghulam Rasul.
I'm originally from Afghanistan,
from Panjshir Valley.
Pretty much since I turned 16,
I've been fighting.
Back then, the Soviet,
and the Taliban today.
I was an independent contractor for CIA.
When you become a translator,
also, you're an advisor,
because I was doing ten different things
that has nothing to do with a linguist.
They would advise me on,
like, tribal code, and how, you know,
the background of a person
and where that person was from
that, for me as a case officer,
informed me and helped me
do my job better.
In September 2006,
I had an opportunity
to interview an Afghan
who I was looking at for a
as a potential source.
We left the embassy compound,
and we went to a nearby intersection
at a traffic circle called Massoud Circle.
And there, I was on the street corner,
waiting for this guy to show up.
As a Westerner,
I look different and stand out.
And there are people
that would try to kill you.
I'm scanning back and forth,
looking for potential threats.
At one point during my scan,
I noticed, just off to my left,
a black Toyota car sitting there.
I noticed there were two guys in it.
They were looking at me.
We were talking, and, uh Gary,
says, "What?
Why is this car parked over here?"
"That's not the place to park."
It's the Ministry of Health,
US Embassy, the security is so tight.
I told him, I said, "It's Afghanistan.
They don't care about where they park."
I accepted it.
Well, then the guy showed up,
so Rasul and I turned
and went back through the, uh,
security checkpoint with the guy,
and walked about 150, 200 meters
back to the embassy gate.
And it was a couple of minutes later,
or less than that, it went off.
There was a deafening explosion.
You could feel the concussion in the air.
And then, all the alarms went off.
Anything within probably 150,
200 meters was just devastated.
If we were there two more minute
we would be bloody.
It was big, and there was
over 35 casualties
and a lot of people wounded.
I went to the embassy security and asked,
"Hey, was that a suicide car bombing?"
And they said, "Yes, they hit
a military convoy at that circle."
I said, "Was it a black Toyota Corolla?"
And they were shocked.
Said, "How could you know that?"
So, the Taliban, the word "Talib"
comes from, uh, the word for student.
They originally came from the madrasas,
religious schools of Pakistan.
And the Taliban movement
really, um, emerged from the ashes
of the Afghan Civil War, which followed
the, uh, end of the Soviet occupation.
And there was this sense
amongst many Afghan people
that, um, the brutality of the civil war,
the corruption of the warlords
who seemed intent on
lining their own pockets
and sort of abusing the people,
um, that gave the Taliban a foothold,
because they offered a sort of pure,
ascetic version, uh, of Islam.
Of course, this was a sort of
seventh-century version of Islam,
where women had to be covered,
uh, from head to toe,
uh, they were subjugated,
um, to their husbands
who often had up to three wives.
Um, there were, you know,
medieval-type punishments,
stonings to death
and chopping the hands off off thieves.
So, it was
a pretty brutal interpretation of Islam.
The Taliban, they were perfectly prepared
to die in in in battle,
but, uh, didn't, uh, necessarily
want to commit suicide.
But, um, once you had, um,
a full-blown insurgency in Iraq,
um, with IEDs and, uh,
suicide bombers being used,
they could see how potent a weapon it was.
During the years
2005 through 2008,
IEDs were growing in their use,
because that was
the weapon the Taliban chose.
An IED is simply a remotely-detonated bomb
planted alongside a roadway.
Then, the suicide vests,
which are either detonated by the wearer,
or sometimes, there is a triggering device
that could detonate it remotely.
And then, you have
the vehicle-borne, uh, IEDs,
which, you know, you can take
compartments in a vehicle,
and just pack it with explosives.
The VBIED in the black Toyota,
at the time,
was the biggest to that date
that had been used in Afghanistan.
I think it was, uh it was
well over 200 pounds of explosives.
Back then,
we had at least once a week,
car bomb, or suicide attack, or something.
And it get worse by
You know, every year, it got worse, worse.
You know, interestingly,
it's all in this strict form of,
uh, Wahhabi Islam,
but suicide bombers, once they get trained
and are ready to go do their mission,
are given cash, which for them is a lot,
uh, and they're told, "Hey, go out.
It's okay if you drink now."
"It's okay if you pay for a woman now,
because you're gonna die,
ending in heaven,
but you'll be forgiven now
because you're gonna do that."
So basically, "Here's some money.
Go live it up, and then go do your job."
And, uh, I found that
quite, you know, interesting,
uh, to say the least.
Some of these suicide bomber,
usually 17, 18, 19, something like that.
One of the kid
I personally I asked him,
"Do you have parents?"
He said no.
He was seven years old.
He was picked up,
and just like him, hundreds,
hundreds of children been
They steal these children.
They take them to the training camp.
For three and a half years,
they're brainwashed.
They put them in a madrasa, and separate.
The teachers, they look for the talent,
how easy they can manipulate them.
They become zombie.
All they wanna do is die.
They want to kill. It doesn't matter.
They just wanna blow themselves up.
During the fight against the Soviets,
refugee camps were stood up in Pakistan,
so it was easy for Taliban
to go there to recruit people.
You have these suicide bombers
crossing the border from Pakistan,
suicide vests being produced,
IEDs being produced and-and transported.
And so, that's a real
breeding ground for the Taliban,
but you also have, uh,
in terms of the United States,
when people have nothing,
if you can offer them a new life,
you can offer them money,
you can offer them a way out.
That That also gives you some leverage.
I thought that perhaps
we could work an an angle,
um, using these Taliban to interdict IEDs.
So, extremely important for the CIA
to, uh, get alongside
the Afghan government,
and also the NDS,
the Afghan intelligence service.
They always realized that the intricacies
of the ethnic and tribal, uh, patchwork
that made up Afghanistan
was something that
they could never understand fully.
In late 2005,
the Afghanistan Chief of Station
introduced me to General Wardak.
He was
the Minister of Defense for Afghanistan.
The purpose of my introduction to him
was to look at ways that the Afghan army
could cooperate with the CIA
to try to help us, um, mount operations
against Taliban or al-Qaeda.
At one point, General Wardak
introduced me to General Fahim,
who in the 1980s
fought with, uh, Jalaluddin Haqqani,
who was one of the key members
of the Taliban.
General Wardak said if I needed
anyone to do anything or go with me,
it would be General Fahim.
General Fahim eventually made contact
with a Taliban mullah named Haimi.
He was a mid-level commander
in the Taliban.
And he wasn't a fighter.
He was a religious guy.
But one of the things he did was,
um, send suicide bombers
and IED components into Afghanistan.
What appealed to the Taliban member
was that, at that time,
the US presence was still growing.
I sort of offered a deal
that if you will cooperate with me
and put down your arms,
A, you're not gonna get killed,
and B, you know,
I'll find ways to work with you
that will be mutually beneficial.
And that's understood to mean, "Okay,
I might get some money out of this."
We eventually came on a plan
to try to get a group of Taliban
to come across the border, uh, illegally,
but meet with me,
and then we would promise
not to arrest them or kill them,
and then we would look and see
if there were ways we could work together.
To bring 29, uh, Taliban members
across the border from Pakistan
into Afghanistan is
is quite an undertaking.
So, you don't wanna be
detected by, uh, the Pakistanis,
you don't want, uh, Taliban to know
that Americans are involved in this,
and, uh, you're operating
on Afghan territory.
The people back at headquarters
in Washington said, "Wait a second."
"Uh, we're bringing in
twenty-something Taliban,
and we're liable if these guys
turn out to be do an attack,
or overpower or kill somebody."
"We brought 'em in,
so that's gonna be bad for the CIA."
The CIA has a group of former military.
We call it GRS,
stands for Global Response Security,
and those are the CIA's bodyguards.
One of the GRS guys,
who I had known from Iraq and before,
was call sign "Brutus."
I always looked at us as
a support element to case officers
that were out trying to collect
their intel and do their job.
Um, so, we would try to support them
the best we can while keeping them safe.
So, kind of think of it
as a Secret Service detail on steroids.
Gary came into my room,
think we had beers,
and he said, "Hey, I got this mission.
Um, do you guys wanna support it?"
And I said, "Okay, what is it?"
He says,
"We're gonna go pick up 29 Taliban
and bring them back to Kabul,
to a safe house."
And I was like, "Gary, is this
sanctioned by headquarters,
or is this just, like,
you're thinking out loud right now?"
He's like, "No, it's gonna happen.
I wanna know if you can support it."
Gotta step back and say,
"Is this the best decision?"
Is that juice worth the squeeze,
as they like to say here in Texas,
or are we getting
too far out of the spectrum here
that we're doing something silly?
And so, one of the things, um,
on the minds of CIA officers all the time
is the potential for what could go wrong.
And one of the things that was foremost
in the minds of all CIA officers
was the fate of Mike Spann
at Qala-i-Jangi on November 25, 2001.
Team Alpha was eight CIA officers.
They were the second team in Afghanistan.
They essentially split up.
Mike Spann and David Tyson
went to Qala-i-Jangi,
which was, uh, a fortress,
uh, just outside Mazar-i-Sharif,
to interrogate al-Qaeda prisoners.
He's a terrorist?
Yes. He's a terrorist.
- These men are terrorists?
- I believe.
All these men are terrorists.
I think you're a terrorist.
You come here
to Afghanistan to kill people.
I don't I
Okay, you wanna talk to him?
One of the things that, uh, David Tyson
and Mike Spann had not realized
uh, was that these al-Qaeda prisoners
had not been properly searched.
Where are you from?
- I'm from Pakistan.
- Pakistan?
- Why did you come to Afghanistan?
- I come from Jihad.
- Against whom?
- Against the terrorism of USA.
But now, you're prisoners
in Mazar-i-Sharif.
Yeah. It's no problem.
All is fair in love and war.
And what had happened
was these al-Qaeda fighters
had come up firing weapons,
exploding grenades, uh, killing guards
forcing them to flee,
and within, really, 30 seconds or so,
uh, the sort of power dynamic
inside Qala-i-Jangi had shifted,
and al-Qaeda, uh,
these fighters, were in control.
And so, Mike was soon, um, basically
having to fight people off with his hands.
Then he disappeared
under a pile of bodies.
And David then, he really,
by his own account, has no option.
He has to kill or be killed,
and that's what he does.
He survived and Mike Spann didn't,
and, uh, that was just the way
events unfolded that day.
Always in back of the mind
of any CIA officer
is a sort of Qala-i-Jangi situation.
For an operation like this,
where you, as a case officer,
are focusing on the mechanics
of trying to persuade someone
to come over to your side,
you don't wanna be thinking excessively
about the security situation.
And so, Ground Branch officers,
CIA paramilitary, uh, officers,
are the people
who specialize in that all the time.
And just like Navy SEALs
or or or Delta Force,
they can get a job done
with sort of maximum killing efficiency,
very, very quickly,
and they can get people out as well.
So, there were five or six of them,
and we went to the border.
The legal crossing point
is called the Torkham Gate,
and the illegal crossing
was in a wadi close by.
And there were a lot of smugglers
and people that crossed illegally there.
I think officials
kind of turned a blind eye to it.
The Taliban, we'd instructed them
to come across one at a time.
That sort of protected us from that
a group of 'em
if they were trying to swarm on us.
The main concern, at that point,
was that any of these guys
could be wearing a suicide vest.
I knew the hug that you give
and the cheek brushing that you do
in a traditional tribal greeting.
I was able to go up to each one
with General Fahim
and hug each guy and rub face.
But when I do that, you know, of course,
I've got my hands on their sides and back,
and I'm gonna feel if they have
a weapon or a suicide vest on.
Somebody like Gary is gonna spot
if there might be a weapon hidden,
if somebody's sweating,
if somebody's nervous.
So, that sort of
eyeball-to-eyeball contact, uh,
you know, sort of a gut check
from, uh, an experienced CIA case officer,
uh, is something
that takes a lot of bravery
because, if it does go wrong,
you could be who's killed.
They were being controlled by Haimi.
He did come across, but he waited
until he sent enough of the others,
I think, to probably gauge that we were
not arresting them or or hurting them.
And then, he crossed.
The plan was that, A, we had to be ready
to protect the Afghans,
but, B, we had to be ready to kill them
if they all decide to try to do an attack.
And we started moving to
up this long, torturous road to Kabul.
As they left the border,
those Taliban men knew that now,
they were in the protection of us,
so their lives were at risk.
And I'm sure they were probably
equally as scared as we were scared.
The trip by road
from Jalalabad to Kabul,
it's fairly long,
and there's some really steep cliffs
with no guardrail around curves.
It's It's a really, uh,
scary drive at any time,
and particularly now, we have 29 Taliban.
Prior to us leaving,
one of the things
that I had asked, uh, the station to do
was to get us a safe house in Kabul.
I found out there was no safe house,
so I called the Minister of Defense,
General Wardak, on the phone.
He started cursing at me
and yelling. He said,
"You want me, in 24 hours,
to find a house in Kabul
to put 29 of my country's enemies in
in secret, and you want it done now?"
But, hey, he's the Minister of Defense,
so he came up somehow
with a house that had a basement,
where we could rent
this house for a little bit
and put these people in the basement.
The safe house
that the general was able to get
was a two-story building
that had a basement.
And again, we moved in at night,
so you had a little cover from night,
but it was in a big, sort of
a well-to-do neighborhood for Kabul.
And, to be honest, there's nothing
you can do in a location like that
that can be secret very long.
Brutus was one of the GRS guys
that came to the safe house
to provide security
for the CIA case officers coming there.
From a security aspect,
it was not a great house.
It was just every house
above us was taller than us. Um
We were exposed coming in and out,
and only got worse from there.
Once we got inside, it was like,
"Oh my God,
this is a horrible, horrible house."
We basically had a basement area
that had one way in, one way out,
and it was
just a security nightmare, uh, for that.
And I said, "Hey, if we do any interviews,
gotta be by the bottom of the stairs."
One of the things that, uh, he told me,
for emergency planning,
"Hey, if, uh if these guys
start trying to overcome us,
don't get trapped in this back corner,
because it'd be hard for us
to get you out of that corner."
It's getting that lone person
separated from the crowd. You know?
The wolves are gonna attack
that lone deer, sheep, whatever it is
that gets out
and makes themselves vulnerable.
It doesn't take long. We were getting
stink eye from these guys.
They did not look like
they were happy to be home,
and, uh, so it was
definitely cause for concern.
It was a nervous time.
Of course, they were probably wondering,
"Is this it?
This where they're gonna kill us?"
One of the Taliban was in misery.
I knew he had a headache or something.
Come to find out through the interpreter,
they said he has a toothache.
So, I got some basic Motrin,
Tylenol, and then came down and was like,
"Hey, brother,
this will make you feel better."
Older guys were like, "No, we're
not taking any of your Western medicine."
I even took two.
I was like, "See? No big deal."
And he took it, and the next day,
he actually gave me a smile
and said, "We're cool."
When that group of Taliban saw
that here's an American who's giving aid
and helping this guy feel good,
then I think that's when,
"Okay. Hey, we're not gonna get killed,
and that you can trust these guys."
At this point,
you've done a lot of the hard work.
Uh, you've got the 29
from Pakistan into, uh, Afghanistan.
Uh, it doesn't seem to be a trap so far,
and now you need to assess
whether they can be turned,
whether they can work, uh, for you,
and whether they could be the key
to, uh, unlocking the IED
suicide bomber network
and, uh, be an asset
that could save American and Afghan lives.
We settled the Taliban in,
and then, over the next 48 hours,
started screening them.
We leaned on both, uh some linguists,
interpreters from the CIA,
but also, uh, General Fahim,
who took a very, uh,
detailed part in helping us question
and work through each one to see
what kind of information and activities
does this guy have access to.
And then, if he's worthwhile,
maybe he's connected to an IED cell.
Maybe he, uh, knows where,
uh, hidden explosives are.
Maybe he has connection
to a more senior Taliban,
or maybe even an al-Qaeda person.
So, that's what
you're gonna screen them for.
Gary probably realized that,
"Hey, a lot of these guys
are very low level." Um
"We could start thinning this herd
and concentrate on the key people
we really wanna talk to."
Of this group of 29, uh, Taliban,
we wound up finding six
that we felt we could trust.
I ended up sending
the rest back to Pakistan,
to refugee camps or whatever,
with a small sum of money
and a "promise"
that they would not take up arms
against the US or Afghanistan.
Plus, I had enough damning info
on them that, you know,
that I could make their lives
miserable by saying,
"Hey, well, you met with an American."
We have a photograph
of a group of those, uh, Taliban
and some of the agency guys
there with them.
The risk that they took was,
if they were ever discovered
cooperating with the US,
certainly with a Taliban person
that they viewed as a traitor,
you they would cut your head off.
I kept about, uh, five other
of those Taliban inside Kabul,
and I used them
like they were a Taliban cell.
I focused more of my effort on Haimi,
who was the leader of the group.
He was more educated than the rest.
He was used to being in charge.
To be honest,
he was an arrogant little son of a bitch.
I sent him back to Pakistan
to resume his place,
but to cooperate with us secretly.
At one point, speaking with Haimi,
he tipped us off that his Taliban seniors
had instructed him
to send a bus into Afghanistan
that had the components
for all the explosives,
detonators, um, triggering devices.
We were able to interdict that bus
and then discovered, you know,
essentially all the components
that would supply an IED factory.
Haimi tipped Fahim off
that, um, he'd been instructed
to send two suicide bombers
to Kabul to conduct
their suicide operation.
Was trying to figure,
how can I meet these suicide bombers?
I came up with a story
for Fahim to tell them
that he knew a Canadian journalist
friendly to the Taliban cause.
And that journalist would interview them,
but after they'd martyred themselves,
he would write stories
and tell the world about them
and their sacrifice, and make them famous.
So, eventually, these two guys agreed
that they would, you know,
talk to this Canadian journalist.
And, of course, the journalist was me.
You're trying to build trust.
You're trying to present yourself
as somebody that is honest and genuine,
but you're pretending
to be a different person. Um
But once you sort of
get into the zone of a role
and you're very focused, you almost
sort of, I think, believe it yourself,
that you are that Canadian journalist
who's trying to get the story
from the Taliban suicide bomber.
Over the course of speaking
with the suicide bombers
is when I started
learning about their situation
and learning about them individually.
The only thing they could do
that would bring
any value to their life at all
was kill themselves,
and then they'd be rewarded in heaven,
and that their family
would be compensated somewhat.
We wanted the Afghan intel service
to get that on film
so they could use that
in sort of a, um, public affairs campaign
to try to show the Taliban in a bad light,
uh, for taking innocent people
from villages and brainwashing them
and turning them
into these suicide bombers.
My family knows I am here,
but they can't stop me.
I am here to commit suicide on America.
But each individual person,
as they get closer to the point of which,
you know, certain death,
they must sorta question it.
They must wonder about it.
If you can get to talk to them
and try and sort of assess
what their motivation is,
it could be huge.
They could tell you, um,
information about the network,
uh, who sent them there, uh,
what the route was that they took in.
So, very, very valuable potential source.
Afghanistan has cold weather.
I was wearing local clothing
and an afghan blanket wrapped around me.
Because the younger was cold
and shaking as he is talking to me,
I had taken the blanket off me
and put it around him,
and told him, you know you know,
to make himself comfortable.
As I got ready to leave,
he started to take that off
and give it back to me, and I said,
"No, it's yours. You keep it."
They told me later that, after I left,
those the two suicide bombers said,
"Wow, we've never met a Westerner before,
and we thought they were all evil,
but that guy seemed nice."
"He seemed normal. He seemed to care."
And they said, "Good thing
he was Canadian and not American."
And, as a result of that,
over the course
of two or three more meetings,
you know, I showed them compassion,
started talking to 'em about their lives,
and what it would take
for them to have a meaningful life,
um, if they ever went back.
'Cause, by that point,
the questions I'm asking them
about their training and indoctrination
and recruitment as suicide bombers,
I'm not really sounding
as much like a journalist,
and and I felt I'd established
enough, uh, credibility with them
that I could you know, come clean.
I eventually told them,
"Hey, I'm an American, and I'm CIA."
I offered them probably
ended up being several hundred dollars,
probably no more than 650.
It would be enough for them to get a start
and not have to return
to be a suicide bomber.
Not only did it save
the suicide bombers from dying,
but it saved how
we don't know how many victims.
And that, in the end, that was,
to me, was the ultimate goal.
By all accounts,
Gary Harrington's actions were,
you know, almost the ultimate actions
of a CIA officer.
You're in the middle of a war. Uh
You're potentially saving American lives.
You're working with Afghan allies.
You're trying to do your bit
to make a difference.
And really, um, you can't ask
a CIA officer to do more than that.
And I've always been sort of yeah, maybe,
as I found out later,
considered in the CIA, a rule breaker,
but, uh, you know, that I broke 'em
not for personal gain, but for, um
to accomplish a mission.
I stood at the top
of the Tora Bora mountains in 2001,
when everything was going our way
and, you know, al-Qaeda was on the run,
Taliban were on the run.
Um, everybody was so happy.
It seemed like such a victory
after going through 9/11.
And, you know,
I told the guys around me that,
"Hey, it's like king of the hill."
"But staying king of the hill
and not being toppled
is gonna be difficult."
So, I knew that, ultimately, a withdrawal
was gonna have to happen.
But, you know, I feel really strongly
that the way it was done,
and not leaving a US presence there,
or not ensuring that the people
who I trusted my life to,
who protected my life,
that we haven't protected theirs.
That That hurts.
I've been in contact with, uh, Rasul.
He is a part of the resistance.
He left his job with the CIA
and returned to Afghanistan.
Now, he is working with Massoud,
the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud,
who was the original Panjshiri
iconic leader before 9/11,
and trying to help him become established
as the main resistance leader.
I'm obligated.
I have to do this.
I have to be with the resistance.
I have to fight these people.
Encourage people.
I mean, I'm getting old, but the thing is,
Pakistan will make Afghanistan
number one terrorist state in the world.
And this is gonna happen
if we don't resist.
So, dark days
in Afghanistan now,
and there's a sense of,
"What was it all for?"
I don't think this is end
of the story.
Taliban, uh, hasn't succeeded
in governing Afghanistan properly.
And, uh, I think there's
another chapter to come.