The World at War s01e10 Episode Script
Wolfpack: U-Boats in the Atlantic (1939 - 1943)
The Atlantic.
A vital route for England.
Treacherous in peace time, threatening black and in war time.
Bandos de U-boats they patrol it night inside.
Although cliente of the danger, its victims continue to furrow waters.
Ships and load disappear.
The crews, some, they survive.
But at the beginning of 1943, it was survival of England e the hope of the Allies to win Germany, that was in doubt.
The World in War The Matilha U-Boats in Atlantic 1939 - 1944 At the beginning of the war, England thought that the ships German they would be the main threat for its maritime commerce.
E had the same thought the Germans.
The ships German would pillage the English merchant fleet that it supplied to the country most of its suppliments and raw materials as well as all the fuel.
The submarines German they would operate in coastal waters destroying what it had escaped to the war vases.
But in such a way England as Germany if had been deceptive.
The submarines would constitute the true naval threat.
Karl Doenitz, Commander of the fleet German of submarines, wise person it.
It could be had been deceptive, if Hitler alone had attacked England after to be constructed to all the ships foreseen for its Navy.
But such did not happen, e Doenitz believed that if it had enough submarines it could win the war naval.
It has the test of this exactly twenty years before.
In October of 1918, I commanded a submarine in the Mediterranean, close to Malta.
In a dark night, we cross with a British naval convoy escorted for cruisers e torpedo-boat destroyers.
We attack and we sink a ship, but we would have had much more possibilities if we had many submarines.
It is therefore that the idea of.
to form one "matilha", to congregate the submarines so that they attacked in group, me it seemed excellent.
E is therefore that in all those years since 1918 until the o year of 1935, year where the German Navy it came back to have submarines, this idea never it left me the head.
Underneath of the water the U-boat of 1939 he was slow.
In the surface it was quicker than any merchant naval convoy.
Had to its low profile it was difficult to sight it, over all at night.
Its targets, these, were perfectly visible in the horizon.
E thanks to the radio, the U-boats they could be grouped quickly.
Doenitz wise person who England it would protect its Atlantic commerce using escorts of warships.
To attack these convoys naval U-boats wanted 300.
When the war started it had only 26 e had that to cover long distances to reach the targets.
When France fell, Doenitz acquired new bases much more next of the merchant routes.
Its Wolf-do-Sea came back to the French ports as heroes.
One of the biggest heroes it was Otto Kretschmer.
Kretschmer more than sank 250 a thousand tons of English ships.
In October of 1940, it was joined to first true "matilha".
I remember myself that.
we receive a signal of a naval convoy that it came of America for England.
We were unaware of its localization.
Doenitz convoked all submarines for the West of Ireland e commanded that they were made use on-line, a stationary line, to intercept the naval convoy.
When sighting the first submarine, the naval convoy emitted a contact signal.
The submarines had left immediately of the formation e each one could to attack freely.
In the night of 17 of October of 1940, naval convoy SC-17 it was passing for Rockall.
He was formed for 34 ships merchant and 4 ships of escort.
It was attacked by seven U-boats in the surface.
The attack occurred in the molds the one that already we were accustomed that is, only one ship was reached.
Shortly afterwards, as ship was reached.
e later, in a question of five or ten minutes, more ships had been reached.
I tried to pierce the escort e to penetrate in the naval convoy, that it was my tactics attack staff.
Of the first time, I failed.
Turn they me, had gone off beepers and I had to remove me.
But in the second attempt I was successful e I obtained to penetrate in the convoy e to sail among the ships to the search of most important, with loads most valuable.
E I had chance to use all my torpedoes.
Twelve, in the total.
It could see some ships in ways to sink.
A dutch ship had stopped to try to collect survivors.
E it observed while it e evaluated the situation, it reached it to a torpedo.
Several other torpedoes they had been gone off e was everything in flames.
In this merchant night, 17 ships, that is, half of the naval convoy, they had been sunk.
The escorts had not obtained to damage an only U-boat.
It had never seen some ships to be sunk at the same time.
He was something completely new for us.
It was the first time that we had chance of to place in practical that tactics.
As much we, as the proper Doenitz, that it only effects it in exercises, in peace time.
It was a successful night.
Until they had called "Night of the Long Knives" for terms sunk as many ships.
In first the nine months of war, England and the allies they had lost 2 million more than of tons of merchant ships.
In the 6 following months, with the U-boats operating from France they had disappeared more It had a rain of medals.
The crew of the submarines German called:"The Happy Times".
Vi the nose of the ship to rise itself of the water and the poop sinking e later fell stops backwards e I sank with it.
When I came back to the surface, still seated in the life-guard capsized in contrast vi the submarines to emerge.
They had started to collect the boxes of merchandize.
Possibly with drinks, similar foods and articles.
They had sailed to our return for a time, they had laughed and later they had left in direction to the Northeast.
They had not asked if we had water, or if it had damages, nor nothing.
E we are, alone there with a life-guard floating between the destroços in the way it way between Brazil and the North of Africa.
I only thought about arriving in land more fast possible therefore I headed for the coast next possible, the Northeast.
We only had a small boat life-guard with capacity for 48 people.
We were 58.
It did not have space it stops seating in them.
The boat was making water for to have been without use some time.
It was difficult to move away the crew to take off the water.
We had that to pass almost two days pouring water until the wood of the boat to swell e if to consolidate.
After this the things they had improved a little.
The worse days were obviously those where it did not have wind, where it was absolute calmness.
The sun was insuportável.
Therefore we start to distribute about 1 dl of water per day half of morning, half at night e a cookie.
It had a great agitation in boat, between the Chinese.
I asked to them to which age the reason of that barulheira.
One of them said:"I find that first machinist went crazy.
" It finished if shooting in the water with a vest life-guard.
Passed a time we obtain to bring it for edge.
Later, already night, it came back to shoot itself in the water.
We do not obtain to rescue it, it was I catch for tubarões.
In the morning of day 13, I was seated in the barrel of the water so that nobody was served without authorization when I was shaken.
They had said me: "Captain, has green lights there" I said to them that they had to be dreaming.
I really looked in redor and vi green lights.
It seemed me to be the wharf of New Brighton, but did not have the certainty.
I ordered to go off a rocket of signalling.
They had gone off it.
Later the Jimmy it ordered to go off another one.
They had gone off plus one.
Passed a bit vi that the lights they were being come close.
They were more visible.
Shortly afterwards vi a red light over the greens.
It was then that I perceived that it was a ship-hospital.
The U-boats had eyes in air.
The Condores Focke-Wolf they could fly over a thousand miles in search of naval convoys.
When they had started to be used to bomb ships Happily for England, the partnership between these and the U-boats never duly were explored.
But Doenitz explored the fact of Private services of the German Navy to have deciphered the British codes.
We knew that they were informed well, but I attributed this the powerful ones sonars that possuíam.
The submarines were equipped with them, what it allowed them to catch the noise of the helices of the ships in a ray of 80 or 100 miles.
But for moreover, I know that they located on-line U-boats, transversally to the foreseen route of the naval convoys.
These lines could arrive to reach one hundred miles of extension.
E with so good sonars it was difficult for a convoy to occult its localization.
After the war only is that we knew that they had deciphered the codes e that knew well the hour very of departure of the naval convoys e how many escorts and ships they composed them to merchant.
The British Navy, in the attempt to detect U-Boats submerged, it deposits its faith in the ASDIC, a type of sonar.
But the U-boats was attacking ships in the surface.
The Navy was not prepared for such.
The defense of merchant ships it was not an interesting activity therefore, in the period between wars, the Navy was concentrated in more interesting activities, as attacks of torpedoes in mass e other things of the sort.
All the information gotten during the first war was available.
It was everything there, stops who wanted to read.
But nobody gave this work.
E as such, the defense of the routes commercial very it was neglected.
E the recklessness continued.
In the first times, the convoys alone were escorted up to 300 miles of each Atlantic coast.
It did not have ships of escort enough.
The ones that existed they were little resistant e its crews practically inexperienced.
My officers were reservists of the Navy, volunteers.
One was civil engineer of profession.
The others two were Canadian, second lieutenant.
Both with 20 or 21 years that they had come of Canada as temporary.
It was the only experience of sea that had.
The heads of Department they were welded regular, some already are of the active, but that they had been called.
It had two or three sailors with experience e the remains were inexperienced.
The aerial protection would come to show basic.
But, initially, the support not it came of the aircraft carriers of the Navy e yes of the RAF, although the lack of preparation of the Coastal Command.
To the exception of the hydroplanes Sunderland, that was few, e of the Anson, all the others aircraft were palliative.
They had been transferred of completely distinct missions e ece of fishes to the service of the Coastal Command.
Moreover, we did not have navigation instruments.
An experienced navigator knows to look at for the sea and the wind e to calculate where it will be from there to one hour, a novice, not.
Given E that the naval convoys that we had to protect also they were deceived frequent in the route, it does not admire that let us have failed many times.
The equipment lack, of preparation and of adequate aircraft they had been very harmful at the beginning of the war.
Moreover, the cooperation between the Navy e the Air Force in the land also it was sufficiently bad had the fight ridicule between officers of high patent in the Government.
Two years had been necessary almost so that the cooperation between ships and aircraft if became efficient.
E is to lament the ships that had sunk e the lives that if had lost without necessity, in these first years.
Therefore, the sailors suffered because of divergences in the Government, of the U-boats and the sea.
It is very difficult to describe to who it is in land what it is a hard trip, that is with bad weather.
Over all in the Winter.
What it is to pass two weeks in the sea living to the meat base canneded and cookies.
E this is not a lie, it happened some times without account.
When the sea entered, the stoves they erased and we could not cook.
Most fortunate they had nets, the others slept in compartments, what it was very desconfortável.
It had youngsters that they finished the turn of monitoring to the four of the morning.
They arrived soggy, and to to look one I sing to sleep, they made marshy the poor fellows that already they were trying to sleep.
It did not have hygiene conditions.
If we did not have care, passed one week already we smelled badly.
We knew that he was one necessary work, but I do not know if we gave in them it counts of that it was important.
It was a flat work very.
To be there of guard, to the wait of that it could or not appear, with a cold to crack.
The bridge was open and it left in them displayed to intempéries, therefore, we were more concentrated in keeping us hot, in fighting the cold e in keeping us dry of what worried about importance of our work.
But the work was important.
They brought the merchandizes on that England depended.
E when we seat in them in cabin is that we think: "Now we are in high-sea, we can at any time be attacked.
" Many times we sighted light in the water that had to be surviving, but we could not stop to collect them.
The sailors compared its wages and the working hours with the ones of the laborers of the ammunition plants that gained a richness risking itself in such a way as our owners of house.
We lost one in each three men e, without them, this nation would not have survived more than 3 or 4 months.
But the Germans continued to festejar victory.
In the first half of 1941, of tons of ships.
The ships were more difficult to substitute of what the load.
If they were sunk to a faster rhythm of what were constructed, it would have hunger in England.
But now the Canadian navy, small at the beginning of the war, it was being become enlarged becoming It would start to escort half of naval convoys in the North Atlantic.
It had each time more convoys naval leaving of Canada, with the full decks of tanks e the full bilges of provisions yielded for U.
S.
A.
, in this height, still neutral.
Alarmed with the number increasing of decreases, the Ministry of the English Defense a special Command created to reorganize the defense of the naval convoys.
For the first time, the Air Force and the Navy they had worked in narrow contribution.
In March of 1941, Doenitz lost three of its better men.
Gunther Priem, that sinks the "Royal Oak" in Scapa Flow.
it was reached by one depth load.
Joachim Schepke.
it was crashed into and it was drowned.
E Kretschmer, bombed in the surface.
prisoner was made.
Only one terço of the fleet could to leave in patrol of each time.
E with the loss of its better commanders now only it could keep half dozen of U-boats in the water.
With a number so reduced of submarines any decisive success in the Battle was impossible terms Atlantic it.
Therefore it was necessary that the construction of submarines if it became a priority in the plan of German armament.
But such did not happen, although the insistence of Admiral Raeder that at the time it was Commander of the German Navy.
E worse still was for coming.
U.
S.
A.
still was officially neutral.
But after the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in September of 1941, U.
S.
A.
had announced that they would protect the ships of any nationality that they sailed between its coasts and of Iceland.
Now it would have ships of war enough to assure escort permanent in the Atlantic route.
It was in the hour to counterattack.
I spoke with some commanders of escorts e I placed the following question: If a U-boat was attacking a naval convoy, at night, as now they make, what it is that vocês they would make? E the majority of them answered: What it is that we could make? They are so small that not we obtain to see them.
At this time, the radars were very rudimentary and had few.
But it had a commander of an escort ship that it launched an idea that still she is perfectly valid.
It suggested that when occurred one has attacked surprise the escort had to act as a whole and of gliding form, accurately at the same time, to be able to cover the biggest area possible around of the naval convoy.
It suggested who it was, obviously, then Walker Commander.
Although it does not have survived to the war, Walker would sink more U-boats that any another commander.
In the 1941 end, it launched a new style in the defense of naval convoys.
In naval convoy HG-76 they followed 36 merchant ships of the whole world.
They had been congregated in Gibraltar to head until England.
The Navy wise person who had for less 6 U-boats in the route of the convoy.
Its signals had been caught for the Admiralty.
When the HG-76 initiated trip in 14 of December of 1941 it made use of an escort bonanza great: dezessete ships commanded for Walker.
Between them, and for the first time, it followed an aircraft carrier to assist, the "Audacity".
Passed 3 days, the airplanes of the "Audacity" they had sighted the U-131.
The escorts had sunk it quickly.
Doenitz sent more 5 submarines to attack the naval convoy.
The team of Walker quickly one of them sank.
But, in this same night, the U-boats had come back to attack.
An escort and a ship merchant had been sunk.
Walker counterattacked.
Walker crashed into and sank the U-547 with its proper ship.
In air, the huntings of the "Audacity" they had pursued the condores German.
One was destroyed e others had been damaged.
But some of the ship-escort they were being without fuel e had had to leave.
One of the U-boats it used to advantage the breach.
The "Audacity" was the following victim.
Another terrible night was followed.
Another ship was sunk.
But Endress, another one ace of the U-boats, it was sunk with its U-567.
In the following day, e for the first time, a long-range Liberator it appeared in scene and it attacked.
Doenitz decided to beat in withdrawal.
Walker had proven the effectiveness of its tactics e the airplanes, its utility.
All the U-boats they had been sunk.
But Doenitz was gives to have its great chance.
In December of 1941, U.
S.
A.
they had entered of time in the war.
.
but they had left lighted its lights of peace time.
The U-boats de Doenitz they had never had as many successes.
Its "happy times" they had come back.
The Americans did not have ships of war enough to escort ships until a coast, therefore were a destination to prevent.
Many ships were escorted in security through the ocean e finished being bombed to the plaza of the coast.
The slaughter continued.
In the second half of 1941, a million was lost almost half e of tons of ships.
In the first half of 1942, the number went up more than for 4 millions, in a total of a thousand ships.
In this rhythm, the Allies they would go to lose the war.
We had that to sink the greater possible number of ships before our rival Anglo-American it could develop armament anti-submarine efficient e to substitute the merchant ships that we had sunk.
But the majority of the submarines Germans were not in the Atlantic.
E yes, to the plaza of the Norway defending the German routes of supplying, or in the Mediterranean.
This left furious Doenitz.
It did not have doubts on where they would have to be used the U-boats.
The submarines German did not have to be used for other functions.
Its main strategical function it was to sink the biggest number possible of ships in the Atlantic.
But Hitler and the High Command they had not given heard to it.
Although worried with the Pacific, the Navy of U.
S.
A.
was made use to rethink the Atlantic strategy.
It established a system finally of escorts to the plaza of the coast.
The number of merchant ships sunk it diminished e had started to disappear U-Boats.
Doenitz detached its submarines for the Caraíbas where still it had many ships circulating without escort.
In two months, 78 ships had been sunk.
More than half was oil.
Already it has much time, but it seems that I am seeing.
The men who were in the poop running envoltos in flames e shooting itself it the sea on of oil that was catching fire.
However I commanded the men that they were in the life-guard they pushed that it with them we remos to move away it from the ship because the rivets of the side of the ship had arrebentado and were in live coal.
We row a little and we hear somebody to cry out for aid.
E we remove of the water a machinist.
It had the body very burnt.
In such a way that we hoist when it the skin of the body and the arms of it was glue in our hands as gloves.
Then we head for Trinidad.
It had a vacant idea where direction was.
We put the boat in sequence e we leave, but shortly afterwards, the machinist, who passes the night entire agonizing, died.
We lie down it in the bank of the remador e had shortly afterwards come to say me that the butler also had died.
I was there to see it.
He was wrapped up in one blanket.
E I discovered when it vi that it had the stomach almost pulled out and displayed.
It had been very patient during the night, only complains of cold.
We lie down it in the bank of the remador e we cover with a blanket.
We wait one hour, therefore it wanted to have the certainty of that they were died.
We did not have ways to know, although everything indicated that they were.
Last E one hour we play the bodies to the sea.
The moral of the crew was very low, was all very new.
They had understood ages between the 17 and 22 years.
In that boat, the atmosphere dominant age of sadness, pain.
e death.
But 8 of the 40 members of the crew of the San Emiliano's they had survived.
For the sailors allies, the members of the crew of the U-boat they were murderous cruel.
But the Germans also they were courage men.
E disclosed it in the attacks with depth loads that they arrived to last Eight in each ten members of the crew of U-boats they had died in action.
They called to the U-boats metal coffins.
The torpedo-boat destroyer with that we confrot in them had radar therefore see it could me in the screen.
It advanced to all speed against me e crashed into me for the first time.
When the vi, already were too much late to submerge.
I tried atingiz it with a torpedo, but we were only about 140 meters of it.
It was too much close stops that the torpedo blew up.
Therefore, I tried to distanciar mine submarine the possible maximum of it.
It went off against us during one or two hours, with machine guns.
An officer who was to my side he died, another officer had been reached in the throat, e I had been whitened in the chest.
It had about 30 splinters in the leg and the arm e a bullet in the head.
After one hour under tension, the men were very anxious.
One of the subordinate officers lost the head and said:"You are wild" "Because it is that we do not relieve in them?" But he was the only one.
But times were come close where the courage was not only enough.
The radio continued to be vital for the "operations matilha".
But the new equipment of localization of the Allies they obtained to catch and to locate the signals of the Germans.
Thanks to the radar of wave-shortnesss the escorts could now locate the U-boat in the surface.
Many times, even before of to sight them to the crew.
The low profile already not constituía great advantage.
The sonars also they were being perfected.
The ship-escort obtained to detect a submerged U-boat while it was moved slowly underneath of water.
It also had new weapons of attack as "hedgehog".
The Germans did not aperceberam themselves of the extension of these advances technician nor they had obtained to equal them.
The Germans had great scientists and excellent engineers.
But they had not gotten results that had.
First, because the Germans were always modifying the priorities, but over all because any active participation was not asked for to them, in contrast of our scientists that members were considered asset of the operational team.
I find more than that it was for this reason, what for the weapons and equipment, that the Germans had been stops backwards in technology terms.
The proper Allies still were delayed in the use of that if it would disclose best weapon against the U-boats: the airplanes with radar.
It was rare the naval convoys to have permanent aerial protection.
They had when it, little ships were lost e disappeared more U-boats.
The problem was the reach.
Now it had escort airplanes come of the North America, of Iceland and the United kingdom.
But it had a vast area in the way Atlantic it where these airplanes they did not obtain to arrive.
The U-boats not they had this limitation.
In the second half of 1942, more than 3,5 million tons, in a total of almost 700 ships, they had been sunk, many of them in this area in the way Atlantic it.
To close this gap they were necessary aircraft carriers of escort.
But it had few available ones.
Another option, was the airplanes long-range, as the Liberator.
But, in 1942, the Americans they needed them in the Pacific.
It still had the bombers Lancaster.
But although the apelos of the Admiralty, the RAF kept all bombing Germany.
Although they have yielded other airplanes.
The Command of Bombers yielded It is clearly that it would have been better if they had yielded ten, but it had that to have a limit.
As official of the Coastal Command it would like to have had plus ones squadrons in the coastal patrol.
But the Command of Bombers also it had few aircraft for the mission that fit to it.
Clearly that they had been come close more "Liberators" of America we could have improved the situation very before saved e the life of many sailors.
Each time more the effort on war it depended on U.
S.
A.
They produced ships merchant e ship-escort in mass to carry material e men for the invaded Europe.
But the security of the route Atlantic it was vital.
In January of 1943, The Roosevelts and the Churchills had decreed that priority had to be given principle to the defeat of the U-boats.
They had constructed ship-escort more sophisticated.
Now it had sufficients to pass to the attack.
But, in January of 43, Doenitz the command of the German Navy assumed.
It excused the majority of the ships e transferred the crews for the submarines.
Finally, it could guarantee the production in mass of submarines.
For month, they were service stations In the Spring of 1943, Doenitz more than had 400 submarines in the active.
The naval convoys they were again at risk.
In May, that one was given that would come to be the decisive battle around Naval Convoy ONS-5.
The ONS-5 was a naval convoy sufficiently small very slow e beyond what already it came unloaded.
We had many problems.
The time was very bad e the ships had been disorganized.
E the South of Iceland, after 3 or 4 days, we were white of several attacks of submarines the majority of which we obtain to subject.
We only lose a ship.
Passed some time, we had a series of very strong winds beyond a small shock against the ice bank of the Gronelândia.
In way that my ship was being without fuel.
It could not supply me in ship-tank because of bad weather e I had to remove me.
The Gretton contacted me e said that it had that to go until a New Land to supply e asked to me if I could to assume the command of the escort.
Or better, it did not ask, it passed me the command.
they had left to supply.
Had to bad weather, ten ships merchants had lost contact.
A front of U-boats waits them.
In day 4 of May, Canadian airplanes sink one and damage another one.
About the 4 and stocking, they had started to launch torpedoes.
I reached two ships, each one with two torpedoes.
E one of the ships.
it did not blow up.
but after the explosion of the torpedoes, had another enormous explosion.
I looked at stops backwards and vi the Commander.
The bridge had to be to ones three four meters above of the water when it jumped for the sea.
E had a life-guard in the water, this I know.
It was as it was, not it could stop to collect it.
E later.
Perhaps passed half minute, also I was reached.
I obtained to pass for a breach between two escorts e to approach me of the column main of the naval convoy.
I went off two torpedoes e both had reached the white ship.
they launch 25 attacks in eight hours.
More ships are sunk.
The naval convoy it seems to be convicted when Doenitz convokes still more submarine.
We receive many signals of other submarines that also they came to the meeting of that naval convoy.
E therefore we think that, more a night, and would be arrasado.
For return of the ten hours, the attack started e they had advanced with everything what they had.
Suddenly, it was arisen a dense fog e became almost impossible to locate the ships.
I tried, but I did not obtain to find them.
The escorts were communicating the arrival of more submarine, but not more attacks the ships.
What it was absolutely.
Good, it was the first time that such it happened, at least with me.
To remain in the surface, of night and with dense fog he was very dangerous.
They were always communicating that they had caught a submarine in the radar e suddenly we heard: "Submarine, side by side.
" or "Submarine to my front, I go to crash into it.
" This lasted the entire night.
I caught a signal very clearly in the sonar, about 700 meters of the ship next.
My immediate reaction, e I have the certainty of that it was made right, it was to increase the speed e to advance direct for it e to compel to remain it underneath of the water for not giving possibility to it to go off no torpedo.
But already it had few loads of depth e as the conditions was perfect, it was a calm night e with a little of fog, it was the ideal stops one has attacked deliberate.
E I decided to leave for the attack with ours "hedgehog".
We saw two flashes distinct when the bombs had reached the water.
E when we passed for the place where the bombs had fallen in the water, our ship almost that it was risen of the water because of the destroyed submarine e that was liberating air.
It had a great euphoria in the bridge, therefore it was the first submarine that we sank.
I must confess that we do not lament the 70 lives that we had destroyed.
After three years of war, great control of the emotions is had.
We or they, e were in that occasion they had been.
Although the loss of 11 ships merchant, the escort defeated the greater "matilha" that Doenitz could congregate.
Seven U-boats had been sunk e damaged others.
Demoralized for its failure when they were in advantage, the U-boat had beaten in withdrawal.
I find that we feel that, finally, our trainings and technology they had surpassed the U-boats.
We sail to the meeting of following convoy, the SC-130, with a feeling of great confidence.
E although terms stopped one U-boats lasts battle with about 20 we obtain to sink three of them without losing no ship.
In this month of May of 1943, In one of them the son died new of Doenitz.
In May of 1943, the submarines German they had lost the quality operational and tactical of its operations in the surface.
E had never recouped it.
Disabled to sail freely in the surface "matilhas" had finally been defeated.
It had that to festejar the victory in the North of Africa and the Atlantic.
More than 30 U-boats had been destroyed in the month of May, in many cases disappearing with its crews in the deepenings of the ocean.
Shaken for these fatal losses, the U-boats had left to lick the wounds e to cry its deceased.
Our naval convoys Atlantic they had arrived in security.
E in result of the victory of May and the slaughter of the U-boats, this month of June was, in all the directions, optimum month that we had in these 46 months of war.
The security of the route of the Atlantic finally was safeguarded.
A vital route for England.
Treacherous in peace time, threatening black and in war time.
Bandos de U-boats they patrol it night inside.
Although cliente of the danger, its victims continue to furrow waters.
Ships and load disappear.
The crews, some, they survive.
But at the beginning of 1943, it was survival of England e the hope of the Allies to win Germany, that was in doubt.
The World in War The Matilha U-Boats in Atlantic 1939 - 1944 At the beginning of the war, England thought that the ships German they would be the main threat for its maritime commerce.
E had the same thought the Germans.
The ships German would pillage the English merchant fleet that it supplied to the country most of its suppliments and raw materials as well as all the fuel.
The submarines German they would operate in coastal waters destroying what it had escaped to the war vases.
But in such a way England as Germany if had been deceptive.
The submarines would constitute the true naval threat.
Karl Doenitz, Commander of the fleet German of submarines, wise person it.
It could be had been deceptive, if Hitler alone had attacked England after to be constructed to all the ships foreseen for its Navy.
But such did not happen, e Doenitz believed that if it had enough submarines it could win the war naval.
It has the test of this exactly twenty years before.
In October of 1918, I commanded a submarine in the Mediterranean, close to Malta.
In a dark night, we cross with a British naval convoy escorted for cruisers e torpedo-boat destroyers.
We attack and we sink a ship, but we would have had much more possibilities if we had many submarines.
It is therefore that the idea of.
to form one "matilha", to congregate the submarines so that they attacked in group, me it seemed excellent.
E is therefore that in all those years since 1918 until the o year of 1935, year where the German Navy it came back to have submarines, this idea never it left me the head.
Underneath of the water the U-boat of 1939 he was slow.
In the surface it was quicker than any merchant naval convoy.
Had to its low profile it was difficult to sight it, over all at night.
Its targets, these, were perfectly visible in the horizon.
E thanks to the radio, the U-boats they could be grouped quickly.
Doenitz wise person who England it would protect its Atlantic commerce using escorts of warships.
To attack these convoys naval U-boats wanted 300.
When the war started it had only 26 e had that to cover long distances to reach the targets.
When France fell, Doenitz acquired new bases much more next of the merchant routes.
Its Wolf-do-Sea came back to the French ports as heroes.
One of the biggest heroes it was Otto Kretschmer.
Kretschmer more than sank 250 a thousand tons of English ships.
In October of 1940, it was joined to first true "matilha".
I remember myself that.
we receive a signal of a naval convoy that it came of America for England.
We were unaware of its localization.
Doenitz convoked all submarines for the West of Ireland e commanded that they were made use on-line, a stationary line, to intercept the naval convoy.
When sighting the first submarine, the naval convoy emitted a contact signal.
The submarines had left immediately of the formation e each one could to attack freely.
In the night of 17 of October of 1940, naval convoy SC-17 it was passing for Rockall.
He was formed for 34 ships merchant and 4 ships of escort.
It was attacked by seven U-boats in the surface.
The attack occurred in the molds the one that already we were accustomed that is, only one ship was reached.
Shortly afterwards, as ship was reached.
e later, in a question of five or ten minutes, more ships had been reached.
I tried to pierce the escort e to penetrate in the naval convoy, that it was my tactics attack staff.
Of the first time, I failed.
Turn they me, had gone off beepers and I had to remove me.
But in the second attempt I was successful e I obtained to penetrate in the convoy e to sail among the ships to the search of most important, with loads most valuable.
E I had chance to use all my torpedoes.
Twelve, in the total.
It could see some ships in ways to sink.
A dutch ship had stopped to try to collect survivors.
E it observed while it e evaluated the situation, it reached it to a torpedo.
Several other torpedoes they had been gone off e was everything in flames.
In this merchant night, 17 ships, that is, half of the naval convoy, they had been sunk.
The escorts had not obtained to damage an only U-boat.
It had never seen some ships to be sunk at the same time.
He was something completely new for us.
It was the first time that we had chance of to place in practical that tactics.
As much we, as the proper Doenitz, that it only effects it in exercises, in peace time.
It was a successful night.
Until they had called "Night of the Long Knives" for terms sunk as many ships.
In first the nine months of war, England and the allies they had lost 2 million more than of tons of merchant ships.
In the 6 following months, with the U-boats operating from France they had disappeared more It had a rain of medals.
The crew of the submarines German called:"The Happy Times".
Vi the nose of the ship to rise itself of the water and the poop sinking e later fell stops backwards e I sank with it.
When I came back to the surface, still seated in the life-guard capsized in contrast vi the submarines to emerge.
They had started to collect the boxes of merchandize.
Possibly with drinks, similar foods and articles.
They had sailed to our return for a time, they had laughed and later they had left in direction to the Northeast.
They had not asked if we had water, or if it had damages, nor nothing.
E we are, alone there with a life-guard floating between the destroços in the way it way between Brazil and the North of Africa.
I only thought about arriving in land more fast possible therefore I headed for the coast next possible, the Northeast.
We only had a small boat life-guard with capacity for 48 people.
We were 58.
It did not have space it stops seating in them.
The boat was making water for to have been without use some time.
It was difficult to move away the crew to take off the water.
We had that to pass almost two days pouring water until the wood of the boat to swell e if to consolidate.
After this the things they had improved a little.
The worse days were obviously those where it did not have wind, where it was absolute calmness.
The sun was insuportável.
Therefore we start to distribute about 1 dl of water per day half of morning, half at night e a cookie.
It had a great agitation in boat, between the Chinese.
I asked to them to which age the reason of that barulheira.
One of them said:"I find that first machinist went crazy.
" It finished if shooting in the water with a vest life-guard.
Passed a time we obtain to bring it for edge.
Later, already night, it came back to shoot itself in the water.
We do not obtain to rescue it, it was I catch for tubarões.
In the morning of day 13, I was seated in the barrel of the water so that nobody was served without authorization when I was shaken.
They had said me: "Captain, has green lights there" I said to them that they had to be dreaming.
I really looked in redor and vi green lights.
It seemed me to be the wharf of New Brighton, but did not have the certainty.
I ordered to go off a rocket of signalling.
They had gone off it.
Later the Jimmy it ordered to go off another one.
They had gone off plus one.
Passed a bit vi that the lights they were being come close.
They were more visible.
Shortly afterwards vi a red light over the greens.
It was then that I perceived that it was a ship-hospital.
The U-boats had eyes in air.
The Condores Focke-Wolf they could fly over a thousand miles in search of naval convoys.
When they had started to be used to bomb ships Happily for England, the partnership between these and the U-boats never duly were explored.
But Doenitz explored the fact of Private services of the German Navy to have deciphered the British codes.
We knew that they were informed well, but I attributed this the powerful ones sonars that possuíam.
The submarines were equipped with them, what it allowed them to catch the noise of the helices of the ships in a ray of 80 or 100 miles.
But for moreover, I know that they located on-line U-boats, transversally to the foreseen route of the naval convoys.
These lines could arrive to reach one hundred miles of extension.
E with so good sonars it was difficult for a convoy to occult its localization.
After the war only is that we knew that they had deciphered the codes e that knew well the hour very of departure of the naval convoys e how many escorts and ships they composed them to merchant.
The British Navy, in the attempt to detect U-Boats submerged, it deposits its faith in the ASDIC, a type of sonar.
But the U-boats was attacking ships in the surface.
The Navy was not prepared for such.
The defense of merchant ships it was not an interesting activity therefore, in the period between wars, the Navy was concentrated in more interesting activities, as attacks of torpedoes in mass e other things of the sort.
All the information gotten during the first war was available.
It was everything there, stops who wanted to read.
But nobody gave this work.
E as such, the defense of the routes commercial very it was neglected.
E the recklessness continued.
In the first times, the convoys alone were escorted up to 300 miles of each Atlantic coast.
It did not have ships of escort enough.
The ones that existed they were little resistant e its crews practically inexperienced.
My officers were reservists of the Navy, volunteers.
One was civil engineer of profession.
The others two were Canadian, second lieutenant.
Both with 20 or 21 years that they had come of Canada as temporary.
It was the only experience of sea that had.
The heads of Department they were welded regular, some already are of the active, but that they had been called.
It had two or three sailors with experience e the remains were inexperienced.
The aerial protection would come to show basic.
But, initially, the support not it came of the aircraft carriers of the Navy e yes of the RAF, although the lack of preparation of the Coastal Command.
To the exception of the hydroplanes Sunderland, that was few, e of the Anson, all the others aircraft were palliative.
They had been transferred of completely distinct missions e ece of fishes to the service of the Coastal Command.
Moreover, we did not have navigation instruments.
An experienced navigator knows to look at for the sea and the wind e to calculate where it will be from there to one hour, a novice, not.
Given E that the naval convoys that we had to protect also they were deceived frequent in the route, it does not admire that let us have failed many times.
The equipment lack, of preparation and of adequate aircraft they had been very harmful at the beginning of the war.
Moreover, the cooperation between the Navy e the Air Force in the land also it was sufficiently bad had the fight ridicule between officers of high patent in the Government.
Two years had been necessary almost so that the cooperation between ships and aircraft if became efficient.
E is to lament the ships that had sunk e the lives that if had lost without necessity, in these first years.
Therefore, the sailors suffered because of divergences in the Government, of the U-boats and the sea.
It is very difficult to describe to who it is in land what it is a hard trip, that is with bad weather.
Over all in the Winter.
What it is to pass two weeks in the sea living to the meat base canneded and cookies.
E this is not a lie, it happened some times without account.
When the sea entered, the stoves they erased and we could not cook.
Most fortunate they had nets, the others slept in compartments, what it was very desconfortável.
It had youngsters that they finished the turn of monitoring to the four of the morning.
They arrived soggy, and to to look one I sing to sleep, they made marshy the poor fellows that already they were trying to sleep.
It did not have hygiene conditions.
If we did not have care, passed one week already we smelled badly.
We knew that he was one necessary work, but I do not know if we gave in them it counts of that it was important.
It was a flat work very.
To be there of guard, to the wait of that it could or not appear, with a cold to crack.
The bridge was open and it left in them displayed to intempéries, therefore, we were more concentrated in keeping us hot, in fighting the cold e in keeping us dry of what worried about importance of our work.
But the work was important.
They brought the merchandizes on that England depended.
E when we seat in them in cabin is that we think: "Now we are in high-sea, we can at any time be attacked.
" Many times we sighted light in the water that had to be surviving, but we could not stop to collect them.
The sailors compared its wages and the working hours with the ones of the laborers of the ammunition plants that gained a richness risking itself in such a way as our owners of house.
We lost one in each three men e, without them, this nation would not have survived more than 3 or 4 months.
But the Germans continued to festejar victory.
In the first half of 1941, of tons of ships.
The ships were more difficult to substitute of what the load.
If they were sunk to a faster rhythm of what were constructed, it would have hunger in England.
But now the Canadian navy, small at the beginning of the war, it was being become enlarged becoming It would start to escort half of naval convoys in the North Atlantic.
It had each time more convoys naval leaving of Canada, with the full decks of tanks e the full bilges of provisions yielded for U.
S.
A.
, in this height, still neutral.
Alarmed with the number increasing of decreases, the Ministry of the English Defense a special Command created to reorganize the defense of the naval convoys.
For the first time, the Air Force and the Navy they had worked in narrow contribution.
In March of 1941, Doenitz lost three of its better men.
Gunther Priem, that sinks the "Royal Oak" in Scapa Flow.
it was reached by one depth load.
Joachim Schepke.
it was crashed into and it was drowned.
E Kretschmer, bombed in the surface.
prisoner was made.
Only one terço of the fleet could to leave in patrol of each time.
E with the loss of its better commanders now only it could keep half dozen of U-boats in the water.
With a number so reduced of submarines any decisive success in the Battle was impossible terms Atlantic it.
Therefore it was necessary that the construction of submarines if it became a priority in the plan of German armament.
But such did not happen, although the insistence of Admiral Raeder that at the time it was Commander of the German Navy.
E worse still was for coming.
U.
S.
A.
still was officially neutral.
But after the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in September of 1941, U.
S.
A.
had announced that they would protect the ships of any nationality that they sailed between its coasts and of Iceland.
Now it would have ships of war enough to assure escort permanent in the Atlantic route.
It was in the hour to counterattack.
I spoke with some commanders of escorts e I placed the following question: If a U-boat was attacking a naval convoy, at night, as now they make, what it is that vocês they would make? E the majority of them answered: What it is that we could make? They are so small that not we obtain to see them.
At this time, the radars were very rudimentary and had few.
But it had a commander of an escort ship that it launched an idea that still she is perfectly valid.
It suggested that when occurred one has attacked surprise the escort had to act as a whole and of gliding form, accurately at the same time, to be able to cover the biggest area possible around of the naval convoy.
It suggested who it was, obviously, then Walker Commander.
Although it does not have survived to the war, Walker would sink more U-boats that any another commander.
In the 1941 end, it launched a new style in the defense of naval convoys.
In naval convoy HG-76 they followed 36 merchant ships of the whole world.
They had been congregated in Gibraltar to head until England.
The Navy wise person who had for less 6 U-boats in the route of the convoy.
Its signals had been caught for the Admiralty.
When the HG-76 initiated trip in 14 of December of 1941 it made use of an escort bonanza great: dezessete ships commanded for Walker.
Between them, and for the first time, it followed an aircraft carrier to assist, the "Audacity".
Passed 3 days, the airplanes of the "Audacity" they had sighted the U-131.
The escorts had sunk it quickly.
Doenitz sent more 5 submarines to attack the naval convoy.
The team of Walker quickly one of them sank.
But, in this same night, the U-boats had come back to attack.
An escort and a ship merchant had been sunk.
Walker counterattacked.
Walker crashed into and sank the U-547 with its proper ship.
In air, the huntings of the "Audacity" they had pursued the condores German.
One was destroyed e others had been damaged.
But some of the ship-escort they were being without fuel e had had to leave.
One of the U-boats it used to advantage the breach.
The "Audacity" was the following victim.
Another terrible night was followed.
Another ship was sunk.
But Endress, another one ace of the U-boats, it was sunk with its U-567.
In the following day, e for the first time, a long-range Liberator it appeared in scene and it attacked.
Doenitz decided to beat in withdrawal.
Walker had proven the effectiveness of its tactics e the airplanes, its utility.
All the U-boats they had been sunk.
But Doenitz was gives to have its great chance.
In December of 1941, U.
S.
A.
they had entered of time in the war.
.
but they had left lighted its lights of peace time.
The U-boats de Doenitz they had never had as many successes.
Its "happy times" they had come back.
The Americans did not have ships of war enough to escort ships until a coast, therefore were a destination to prevent.
Many ships were escorted in security through the ocean e finished being bombed to the plaza of the coast.
The slaughter continued.
In the second half of 1941, a million was lost almost half e of tons of ships.
In the first half of 1942, the number went up more than for 4 millions, in a total of a thousand ships.
In this rhythm, the Allies they would go to lose the war.
We had that to sink the greater possible number of ships before our rival Anglo-American it could develop armament anti-submarine efficient e to substitute the merchant ships that we had sunk.
But the majority of the submarines Germans were not in the Atlantic.
E yes, to the plaza of the Norway defending the German routes of supplying, or in the Mediterranean.
This left furious Doenitz.
It did not have doubts on where they would have to be used the U-boats.
The submarines German did not have to be used for other functions.
Its main strategical function it was to sink the biggest number possible of ships in the Atlantic.
But Hitler and the High Command they had not given heard to it.
Although worried with the Pacific, the Navy of U.
S.
A.
was made use to rethink the Atlantic strategy.
It established a system finally of escorts to the plaza of the coast.
The number of merchant ships sunk it diminished e had started to disappear U-Boats.
Doenitz detached its submarines for the Caraíbas where still it had many ships circulating without escort.
In two months, 78 ships had been sunk.
More than half was oil.
Already it has much time, but it seems that I am seeing.
The men who were in the poop running envoltos in flames e shooting itself it the sea on of oil that was catching fire.
However I commanded the men that they were in the life-guard they pushed that it with them we remos to move away it from the ship because the rivets of the side of the ship had arrebentado and were in live coal.
We row a little and we hear somebody to cry out for aid.
E we remove of the water a machinist.
It had the body very burnt.
In such a way that we hoist when it the skin of the body and the arms of it was glue in our hands as gloves.
Then we head for Trinidad.
It had a vacant idea where direction was.
We put the boat in sequence e we leave, but shortly afterwards, the machinist, who passes the night entire agonizing, died.
We lie down it in the bank of the remador e had shortly afterwards come to say me that the butler also had died.
I was there to see it.
He was wrapped up in one blanket.
E I discovered when it vi that it had the stomach almost pulled out and displayed.
It had been very patient during the night, only complains of cold.
We lie down it in the bank of the remador e we cover with a blanket.
We wait one hour, therefore it wanted to have the certainty of that they were died.
We did not have ways to know, although everything indicated that they were.
Last E one hour we play the bodies to the sea.
The moral of the crew was very low, was all very new.
They had understood ages between the 17 and 22 years.
In that boat, the atmosphere dominant age of sadness, pain.
e death.
But 8 of the 40 members of the crew of the San Emiliano's they had survived.
For the sailors allies, the members of the crew of the U-boat they were murderous cruel.
But the Germans also they were courage men.
E disclosed it in the attacks with depth loads that they arrived to last Eight in each ten members of the crew of U-boats they had died in action.
They called to the U-boats metal coffins.
The torpedo-boat destroyer with that we confrot in them had radar therefore see it could me in the screen.
It advanced to all speed against me e crashed into me for the first time.
When the vi, already were too much late to submerge.
I tried atingiz it with a torpedo, but we were only about 140 meters of it.
It was too much close stops that the torpedo blew up.
Therefore, I tried to distanciar mine submarine the possible maximum of it.
It went off against us during one or two hours, with machine guns.
An officer who was to my side he died, another officer had been reached in the throat, e I had been whitened in the chest.
It had about 30 splinters in the leg and the arm e a bullet in the head.
After one hour under tension, the men were very anxious.
One of the subordinate officers lost the head and said:"You are wild" "Because it is that we do not relieve in them?" But he was the only one.
But times were come close where the courage was not only enough.
The radio continued to be vital for the "operations matilha".
But the new equipment of localization of the Allies they obtained to catch and to locate the signals of the Germans.
Thanks to the radar of wave-shortnesss the escorts could now locate the U-boat in the surface.
Many times, even before of to sight them to the crew.
The low profile already not constituía great advantage.
The sonars also they were being perfected.
The ship-escort obtained to detect a submerged U-boat while it was moved slowly underneath of water.
It also had new weapons of attack as "hedgehog".
The Germans did not aperceberam themselves of the extension of these advances technician nor they had obtained to equal them.
The Germans had great scientists and excellent engineers.
But they had not gotten results that had.
First, because the Germans were always modifying the priorities, but over all because any active participation was not asked for to them, in contrast of our scientists that members were considered asset of the operational team.
I find more than that it was for this reason, what for the weapons and equipment, that the Germans had been stops backwards in technology terms.
The proper Allies still were delayed in the use of that if it would disclose best weapon against the U-boats: the airplanes with radar.
It was rare the naval convoys to have permanent aerial protection.
They had when it, little ships were lost e disappeared more U-boats.
The problem was the reach.
Now it had escort airplanes come of the North America, of Iceland and the United kingdom.
But it had a vast area in the way Atlantic it where these airplanes they did not obtain to arrive.
The U-boats not they had this limitation.
In the second half of 1942, more than 3,5 million tons, in a total of almost 700 ships, they had been sunk, many of them in this area in the way Atlantic it.
To close this gap they were necessary aircraft carriers of escort.
But it had few available ones.
Another option, was the airplanes long-range, as the Liberator.
But, in 1942, the Americans they needed them in the Pacific.
It still had the bombers Lancaster.
But although the apelos of the Admiralty, the RAF kept all bombing Germany.
Although they have yielded other airplanes.
The Command of Bombers yielded It is clearly that it would have been better if they had yielded ten, but it had that to have a limit.
As official of the Coastal Command it would like to have had plus ones squadrons in the coastal patrol.
But the Command of Bombers also it had few aircraft for the mission that fit to it.
Clearly that they had been come close more "Liberators" of America we could have improved the situation very before saved e the life of many sailors.
Each time more the effort on war it depended on U.
S.
A.
They produced ships merchant e ship-escort in mass to carry material e men for the invaded Europe.
But the security of the route Atlantic it was vital.
In January of 1943, The Roosevelts and the Churchills had decreed that priority had to be given principle to the defeat of the U-boats.
They had constructed ship-escort more sophisticated.
Now it had sufficients to pass to the attack.
But, in January of 43, Doenitz the command of the German Navy assumed.
It excused the majority of the ships e transferred the crews for the submarines.
Finally, it could guarantee the production in mass of submarines.
For month, they were service stations In the Spring of 1943, Doenitz more than had 400 submarines in the active.
The naval convoys they were again at risk.
In May, that one was given that would come to be the decisive battle around Naval Convoy ONS-5.
The ONS-5 was a naval convoy sufficiently small very slow e beyond what already it came unloaded.
We had many problems.
The time was very bad e the ships had been disorganized.
E the South of Iceland, after 3 or 4 days, we were white of several attacks of submarines the majority of which we obtain to subject.
We only lose a ship.
Passed some time, we had a series of very strong winds beyond a small shock against the ice bank of the Gronelândia.
In way that my ship was being without fuel.
It could not supply me in ship-tank because of bad weather e I had to remove me.
The Gretton contacted me e said that it had that to go until a New Land to supply e asked to me if I could to assume the command of the escort.
Or better, it did not ask, it passed me the command.
they had left to supply.
Had to bad weather, ten ships merchants had lost contact.
A front of U-boats waits them.
In day 4 of May, Canadian airplanes sink one and damage another one.
About the 4 and stocking, they had started to launch torpedoes.
I reached two ships, each one with two torpedoes.
E one of the ships.
it did not blow up.
but after the explosion of the torpedoes, had another enormous explosion.
I looked at stops backwards and vi the Commander.
The bridge had to be to ones three four meters above of the water when it jumped for the sea.
E had a life-guard in the water, this I know.
It was as it was, not it could stop to collect it.
E later.
Perhaps passed half minute, also I was reached.
I obtained to pass for a breach between two escorts e to approach me of the column main of the naval convoy.
I went off two torpedoes e both had reached the white ship.
they launch 25 attacks in eight hours.
More ships are sunk.
The naval convoy it seems to be convicted when Doenitz convokes still more submarine.
We receive many signals of other submarines that also they came to the meeting of that naval convoy.
E therefore we think that, more a night, and would be arrasado.
For return of the ten hours, the attack started e they had advanced with everything what they had.
Suddenly, it was arisen a dense fog e became almost impossible to locate the ships.
I tried, but I did not obtain to find them.
The escorts were communicating the arrival of more submarine, but not more attacks the ships.
What it was absolutely.
Good, it was the first time that such it happened, at least with me.
To remain in the surface, of night and with dense fog he was very dangerous.
They were always communicating that they had caught a submarine in the radar e suddenly we heard: "Submarine, side by side.
" or "Submarine to my front, I go to crash into it.
" This lasted the entire night.
I caught a signal very clearly in the sonar, about 700 meters of the ship next.
My immediate reaction, e I have the certainty of that it was made right, it was to increase the speed e to advance direct for it e to compel to remain it underneath of the water for not giving possibility to it to go off no torpedo.
But already it had few loads of depth e as the conditions was perfect, it was a calm night e with a little of fog, it was the ideal stops one has attacked deliberate.
E I decided to leave for the attack with ours "hedgehog".
We saw two flashes distinct when the bombs had reached the water.
E when we passed for the place where the bombs had fallen in the water, our ship almost that it was risen of the water because of the destroyed submarine e that was liberating air.
It had a great euphoria in the bridge, therefore it was the first submarine that we sank.
I must confess that we do not lament the 70 lives that we had destroyed.
After three years of war, great control of the emotions is had.
We or they, e were in that occasion they had been.
Although the loss of 11 ships merchant, the escort defeated the greater "matilha" that Doenitz could congregate.
Seven U-boats had been sunk e damaged others.
Demoralized for its failure when they were in advantage, the U-boat had beaten in withdrawal.
I find that we feel that, finally, our trainings and technology they had surpassed the U-boats.
We sail to the meeting of following convoy, the SC-130, with a feeling of great confidence.
E although terms stopped one U-boats lasts battle with about 20 we obtain to sink three of them without losing no ship.
In this month of May of 1943, In one of them the son died new of Doenitz.
In May of 1943, the submarines German they had lost the quality operational and tactical of its operations in the surface.
E had never recouped it.
Disabled to sail freely in the surface "matilhas" had finally been defeated.
It had that to festejar the victory in the North of Africa and the Atlantic.
More than 30 U-boats had been destroyed in the month of May, in many cases disappearing with its crews in the deepenings of the ocean.
Shaken for these fatal losses, the U-boats had left to lick the wounds e to cry its deceased.
Our naval convoys Atlantic they had arrived in security.
E in result of the victory of May and the slaughter of the U-boats, this month of June was, in all the directions, optimum month that we had in these 46 months of war.
The security of the route of the Atlantic finally was safeguarded.